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ABSTRACT
This study builds on the work on community power structure
which has evolved since the publication of the Lynds' Middletown.
An empirical examination of the conflict over the proposed
construction of the Orlando Utilities Commission's Curtis H.
Stanton Energy Center is undertaken in the context of alternative
~

hypotheses concerning the structure of power.
The theoretical positions of the two major schools of
community power structure--plural-elitist and single-elitist-are examined.

The

orig~ns

and arguments for the plant are

presented, and the origins, tactics and counter-arguments of the
opposition to the plant are also examined.

The interaction and

development of the conflict between the opposing strategies is
then analyzed.
This study concludes that in the case of the Stanton Energy
Center, the single-elitist hypothesis was confirmed.

A small,

business-oriented elite, having control over major financial
resources and access to the mass media, overwhelmed public
advocacy groups which had a narrow base of support, few
organizational and financial resources, and little cohesion.

CHAPTER I
THE ESSENCE OF POWER AND PARTICIPATION
Introduction
Describing what must be considered one of the most elusive
of phenomena, Donald W. Harward (1982) states that:
Power is sought and avoided, paraded and hidden,
accumulated and lost.

It can be desirable and

offensive, enduring or ephemeral . . . those who
have it want it more, and those that don't have it
want it more.

(p. iv)

Perhaps in no other aspect of life has this pervasive
phenomemon been more explicitly studied than in community politics.
·one need only consider the continuous flow of research generated by
the quest to define power to fully appreciate the salience of this
concept in explaining sociopolitical relations in any community.
Much of this interest in the subject of community power stems
from the debate over the extent to which an elite controls governmental and community affai"rs.

According to Rose (1967, p. 1) this

debate can be traced at least as far back in American history as
the political attacks of some Jeffersonian or some Hamiltonians at
the end of the 18th century.

"Scarcely any lower-class political

movement in the United States has failed to express the theme that
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the upper classes successfully used non-democratic means to thwart
democratic processes. 11

The author further notes that Anarchism and

Marxism, imports from Europe, also accept the theme as
one of the basic elements of their ideologies.

Not only

do Marxists regard "the big economic man" as the true power
holder, but they also view pre-socialist societies as
involving the exploitation or dominance of one group over
the other.
For Marx, the relations of production were the most accurate
indicators of who holds power in any community.

Other scholars

have traditionally tended to use participation in decision-making
and control of key institutions as their operational definitions of
power.

There are also those scholars who combine both approaches

in determining the nature of power.
This study focuses on participation in decision-making as the
major yardstick for measuring the concept of power.
approach is used to explore this question.

A case study

The particular case

examined is the decision of the Orlando Utilities Commission to
build a multi-million dollar electrical plant, and the subsequent
public political and legal battle by community forces which
attempted to stop the building of the plant.
Despite the rise of voca 1 oppos.i ti on, most of the affected
populace remained quiescent throughout the public debate.

Was

the lack of widespread participation in the fight against the
power plant the result of apathy, ignorance or indifference among
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the masses?

Was there manipulation of the issue by those who

control the decision-making machinery?

What groups did arise and

what strategies were employed by both opposition groups and those
who supported the construction of the power plant in pursuit of
their ends?
This study explores the alternative hypothetical approaches
to power and the operational definitions employed by scholars.
After" this, the present work examines the OUC controversy and
ultimately explores the resolution of this conflict within the
context of these models of power.

Finally, conclusions are drawn

concerning the most appropriate definition of power and strategy
for empirically exploring the locus of power within this particular
situation.
Three Alternative Dimensions of Power
There have been several major alternative views on dimensions
of power.

Steven Lukes, in his book, Power:

A Radical View,

summarizes what is termed the "three dimensions" of power.

The

first dimension, according to Lukes, (1974, pp. 20-38) is based on the
traditional pluralists' approach, the second, essentially reflects
Bachrach and Baratz's concept of power's "hidden face, 11 and the
third originates with Lukes.
The first view of power is what may be called the explicit,
or 11 open 11 manifestation of power.

One leading proponent of this

dimension of power, the pluralist view, is Nelson Polsby.

4

Polsby (1960) contends that:
Nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any
community . . . If anything, there seems to be an
unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at
bottom nobody dominates in a town, so that their first
question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?"
but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?"
Jhe first query is somewhat like,

11

Have you stopped

beating your wife? 11 in that virtually any response short
of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers
with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the
stratification theory.

(p. 479)

Polsby's conception of power flows directly from the work of
Max Weber and other traditional theorists.
Weber ( 1947, p. 132) writes, is

11

The presence of power,

the probability that one actor within

a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will
despite resistance, regardless of the basis upon which the
probability rests."

For Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950),

"Power is participation in the making of decisions:

G has power

over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the
making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H. 11

And both

James MacGregor Burns and Bertrand Russell (1938, p. 35) define power
simply as "the production of intended effects. 11
Taking the latter's definition a little further, R. H. Tawney
(1931, p. 230) describes power as

11

the capacity of an individual, or
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group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals,
or groups in the manner which he desires."

Implying essentially

the same relationship, Robert Dahl (1967), perhaps one of the
foremost contemporary pluralist power theorists, states that "My
intuitive idea of power is something like this:

A has power over

B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do. 11
' Floyd Hunter, . (1953, pp. 2-3) as a single-elite-power theorist,
is usually viewed in opposition to Dahl, seems to agree with him in
the sense that he argues that power describes "the acts of men
going about the business of moving other men to act in relation
to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things."
Power, Hunter adds, "involves decision-making and it also involves
the function of executing policies--or seeing to it that things
get done which have been deemed necessary to be done.

11

Expanding on Hunter's "relationship" concept, Polsby (1980,
p. 4) states that degree of power is determined by 11 who
participates, who gains or loses, and who prevails in decisionmaking.11

Other scholars, including Jack Hirshleifer (1984, p. 506)

share the view that power revolves around these important
ingredients.
But power, other theorists argue, is not confined to the
overt activities in the decision-making arena.
subtle, "hidden face,

11

There is a more

marked by the manipulation of power
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outcomes by those in advantageous positions, but not necessarily
in

11

visible 11 form of control.

One of the earliest proponents of

this view of power, E. E. SchattsGhneider, (1960) argues that

11

It is

profoundly characteristic that responsibility for the widespread
non-participation is attributed wholly to ignorance, indifference
and shiftlessness of the people."
There is a better explanation:

But Schattschneider continues:
absenteeism reflects

khe suppression of the options and alternatives that
reflect the needs of the non-participants.

It is not

necessarily true that people with the greatest needs
participate in politics most actively--whoever decides
what the game is about decides who gets in the game.
(p. 105)
Taking his argument even further, Schattschneider
contends that all forms of political organization have a basis
in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the
suppression of others because organization is the mobilization
of bias some issues are organized into politics while others are
organized out.

Expressing a similar idea in different words,

Michael Parenti (1970, p. 501) states that "One of the most important
aspects of power is not to prevail in a struggle, but to
predetermine the agenda of the struggle--to determine whether
certain questions ever reach the competitive stage. 11

7

The concept of the "mobilization of basis" has been considered
the brainchild of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who contend that there
are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only
one of which the political scientists see.

The thrust of Bachrach

and ·Baratz's argument is that one face of power manifests itself in
the outcome of the "overt decision-making process," and the other
face manifests itself in the capacity of individuals and groups to
prevent issues or contests from arising which could threaten their
interests.
More specifically, the authors explain, the mobilization of
bias represents

11

a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and

institutional procedures--rules of the game--that operate
systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons
and groups at the expense of others.

Those who benefit are placed

in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests"
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962).

Bachrach and Baratz further argue that

mobilization of bias not only may be wielded upon decision-making
in political arenas, but it, in turn, is sustained primarily
through "non-decisions."

According to the authors:

A non-decision . . . is a decision that results in
suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge
to the values or interests of the decision-maker.

To be

more explicit, non-decision-making is a means by which
demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits
and privileges in the community can be suffocated before
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they are voiced, or kept covert; or killed before they
gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or,
failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the
decision-implementing stage of the policy process.
(pp. 43-44)
Perhaps more than anything else, the arguments advanced by
proponents of power's second dimension have suggested that the
exercrise of power is not confined to the decision-making arena,
but extends to the issue-formation sphere and beyond.
In fact, some theorists argue that power is so pervasive it
penetrates the very social fabric of society, reducing the masses
to a state of powerlessness and quiescence.

Lukes (1974), the

major exponent of this view, contends that there is a third
dimension of power, the mechanisms of which are by far the least
developed and least understood in political science.

This third

dimension involves acceptance of the dominant pattern of power
by the subordinate groups in society.
Identifying the traits of third-dimension power may include
the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how they
are shaped or manipulated in power processes.

Furthermore, this

"hidden face" of power may also be displayed in communication, and
may involve as well a focus upon the means by which "social
legitimations 11 are developed around the dominant, and instilled
as beliefs or roles of the dominated.
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Such processes, which serve to induce actions and beliefs that
might not have otherwise developed. may take direct observable
forms.

"One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about

Brave New World, or the world of B. F. Skinner to see this, 11
Lukes argues (1974, p. 23).

"Thought control takes many less total

and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the
mass media, and through the process of socialization-. 11
Apart from these information-control processes, other more
indirect means by which power alters political conceptions have
been identified.

Among them, Gaventa explains, are psychological

adaptations to the state of being powerless, especially for highly
deprived or vulnerable groups.
Ira Katznelson (1973) and Walter Karpin (1974) among others,
argue that a sense of powerlessness may manifest itself as
"extensive fatalism, self-depreciation, or undue apathy about
one's situation.

It may, according to Friere (1972, p. 3) also lead

to "a greater susceptibility to the internalization of values, beliefs,
or rules of the game of the powerful as a further adaptive response."
The Debate Over an

11

0perational 11 Definition of Power

There is no consensus on the theoretical meaning of power,
and there is also a lack of a standard broadly-accepted definition
to guide empirical examinations of power.
Among the numerous competing theoretical definitions currently
guiding empirical research on power are those espoused by the
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elitist theories of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert
Michels and their disciples.

Sidney Hooks (1978) explains that:

In every society the actual laws, and the exercise of
power are derived not from the thoughts, passions and will
of the many, but from the decisions of an elite few in
legislative, judicial, and executive roles.

Therefore,

democracy is a myth, majority rule an empty shibboleth,
and all political change consists in a succession of power
elites.

(p. 14)

Mosca et al. contend that order is possible without a 11 political
class 11 --a politically dominant class, the class of a minority.
Expanding on this view, Michels (1962) states that "the
eternal struggles" between aristocracy and democracy have never
been anything more than struggles between an old minority, defending
its actual predominance and a new and ambitious minority, intent
upon the conquest of power, desiring either to fuse with the
former or to dethrone and replace it.
The scenario described by Michels is referred to as "The
Iron Law of Oligarchy. 11

Applying this law specifically to

voluntary organizations seeking to alter aristocratic power,
Michels (1962, p. 342) explains that "The initial need for strong
leadership within the organization leads to the adoption of
'militaristic ideas and methods'"

In attempting to build power

to combat the external situation, the reform organization develops

11
oligarchic tendencies.

The oligarchic power in turn has effects

upon the consciousness of the powerholders, leading to a belief in
their own superiority.
The theory that power in any community rests in the hands of
a select few has also been stated by C. W. Mills.

In his celebrated

work, The Power Elite, Mills (1956, p. 324) posits that the
existence of an

11

omnipotent, cohesive" society-wide elite--the

...

power elite.

"The top of American society is increasingly unified,

and often seems well coordinated:

at the top there has emerged an

elite of power. 11
According to Mills, (pp. 3-9) this elite comprises "corporate
chief, political directors, and Pentagon warlords . . . men whose
positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of
ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions
having major consequences."

Mills also claims that this triangle

of political, economic and military elite is

11

an intricate set

of overlapping cliques," in command of the major hierarchies and
organizations of modern society.
In addition, Mills contends that the middle levels of
power--legislators and interest groups--are adrift and competitive.
The masses at the bottom of the pyramidal power structure are
atomized and powerless.
Like Mills, James Meisel (1958, p. 4) argues that community power
is concentrated in the hands of an elite.

Presenting his case in
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what is now referred to as the "three-Cs concept"--group
consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy--Meisel states that
elite rule implies "the collective manipulation of the masses
by a small 1eadershi p group or by severa 1 such groups. 11

"We

will assume," Meisel continues, "that all the members of the
elite are alert to their group interests; that this alertness
is in turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or explicit,
of gr®up or class solidarity; and at last, that this solidarity
is expressed in a common will of action."
Among other political theorists who share the elitist concept
of power are Geoffrey Roberts and Harold Lasswell.

In every

"social collectivity, 11 ·Roberts (1971, p. 79) writes, there is a
minority which

11

exerci ses a preponderant influence within the

collectivity."· Concurring with Roberts, Lasswell (1961, p. 66) states
that "the political elite comprises the power holders of a body
politic."

According to Lasswell, the powerholders include the leader-

ship and social formations which the leaders typically come to and
which accountability is maintained during the given generation.
other words," Lasswell explains, "the political elite is the top
power class."
In contrast to this school, the "pluralist theorists,"
foremost among them contemporary pluralist Robert Dahl, argue
that single-elite theorists have introduced a major flaw into
their conceptions of "ruling elite."

The controlling group

"In
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identified by single-elite theorists, Dahl (1967, p. 211) contends,
has been treated as

11

a pure artifact of democratic rule. 11

According to

Dahl, any controlling group that is a product of rules that are
actually followed in social setting, in which a majority of
individuals could dominate if they pursued certain courses of
action permissible under the "real" rule, sho'uld be excluded from
the definition of ruling elite.
"'A ruling elite, then, 11 Dahl (1967) writes,

11

is a controlling

group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of
democratic rules.

It is a minority of individuals whose preference

regularly prevails in cases of differences in preferences on key
political issues."
In his classic study of New Haven "Who Governs?, 11 Dahl (1961,
pp. 101-102) concludes that the typical U.S. community is not a mono1 ith, but rather a pluralistic system.

In New Haven Dahl reportedly

found a "highly pluralistic system," characterized by "stubborn
and pervasive ambiguity, 11 in which both leaders and led, drawn from
many strata of the community and occupying diverse roles, both led
and were led, and in which it was necessary to distinguish "direct"
influences--possessed by relatively few-- from

11

indirect 11 --possessed by

a great many.
The variations in the foregoing ·definitions for "ruling
elite, 11 underscore two crucial problems, Zuckerman (1977)
contends.

First, he points out that different labels are often
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used to refer to the same concept; and secondly, different
concepts are covered by the same label.

Defining the political

elite as those who control "real effective power,

11

Zuckerman

argues, generates the question of exactly how does one ascertain
who they are.
"the 'real

1

To this question Dahl (1967, p. 269) answers that

political elite is so powerful as to be hidden from view. 11

According to Dahl, the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling
elite rcan be strictly tested only if:

(i) the hypothetical ruling

elite is a well-defined group; (ii) there is a fair sample of cases
involving key political discussions in which the preferences of the
hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely
group that might be suggested; and (iii) in such cases, the
preferences of the elite regularly prevail.
These defining characteristics, Zuckerman (1977, p. 332) contends,
are "so numerous and the requirements of testing are so stringent that
it is scarcely possible that the 'data container' ruling elite
will ever be filled."

Besides, Zuckerman contends that the use

of cohesion as a defining characteristic may indicate the
normative concerns of the analysts and serve as a source of
confusion •
Perhaps more than anything else though, the foregoing
presentation of exclusive or conflicting operational definitions
of power and elitism underline the common inclination among
social scientists to view societies as asymmetrical in the
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distribution of political power.

Furthermore, it highlights the

fact that scholars of community power have been polarized into
· two distinct schools of thought.

Commenting on this phenomenon,

David M. Ricci (1970) states that there are those social scientists
who tend to find at least "several competing centers 11 of local or
national power.
11

tight~y-knit

11

Other students of community power tend to find a
stru~ture

they investigate.
11

of leadership--a ruling stratum--wherever

However, according to Frederick Frey (1971, p. 1101),

More precise empirical analysis of the character of the U.S. local

po 1itica1 e 1i te is required. 11
Some Landmark Empirical Case Studies
Despite the disagreement over an operational definition for
power, most power theorists seem to share the view that ·elites
are crucially important political actors, if indeed, they do exist.
Building on the foundation of speculation and empirical analysis
established by Mosca, Michels, Pareto, Weber

others, Lasswell

~nd

(1958, p. 13) himself an early investigator of elites, claims that
11

the study of po 1it i cs is the study of influence and the

influential 11 --society'.s elites, who enjoy the bulk of society's
valued products.
Robert and Helen Lynd, (1937) in their well-known studies of
Muncie, Indiana (Middletown), reached basically the same conclusion.
They contend that in the Middletown of 1925 the

11

dominant interests"
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in the community were those of the business class.

For decades

Middletown had been controlled by "a small business elite"
which in turn was dominated by one family.

The power of this

"business class," the Lynds (p. 97) argue, was based on the
"pervasiveness of the long fingers of capitalist ownership," and
"the economic life of the city 11 --particularly on the ability
of this group to control the extension of credit.

The business-

control group, according to the Lynds, was comprised of local
manufacturers, bankers, the local head managers of national
corporations with units in Middletown and "one or two outstanding
lawyers."
As for the typical city official, the Lynds describe him as
a "man of meager caliber," and as "the man whom the inner business
group ignore economically and socially and use political.ly. 11
Elaborating on this relationship between businessmen and
politicians, the Lynds state that:
The professional politician in a city like Middletown
occupies in reality a position somewhat apart.

He is

not ordinarily a person accepted in the inner councils
of the business class, and yet he must work with it in
order to get anywhere.

And on the other hand, the

business class have ... little respect for local
politics and politicians, viewing them as necessary
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evils which business supports and controls only
enough to ensure corporation in necessary matter.
(o. 329)

Additionally, the Lynds report that the lines of leadership
and the related controls are highly concentrated.

"Middletown

has . . . at present what amounts to a reigning royal family.

The

power of this family has become so great as to differentiate the
...

city today somewhat .from cities with a more diffuse type of
control."
Using the comments of a Middletown resident, the Lynds further
dramatize the magnitude of control exercised by this particular
family:
If I'm out of work, I g·o to X plant; if I need money,
I go to X bank, and if they don't like me I don't get
it; my children go to X college; when I get sick, I
go to X hospital; I buy a building lot or house in an
X subdivision; my wife goes downtown to buy clothes at
X department store . . . I read the news from X morning
paper; and, if I am rich enough, I travel via the X
airport.

(p. 74)
Regional City

(Atl~nta,

Georgia)

Joining the Lynds in their quest to empirically define
community power is Floyd Hunter, unquestionably one of the foremost proponents of the stratification/elitist theory.
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Hunter's classic study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia),
probably has generated more controversy on the subject of community
power than any other similar effort.

Not only has this work

occasioned the seemingly endless furor in political circles, but
it has also played a pivotal role in revitalizing and bringing new
meaning to the study of the contemporary community power.
Supporting this view, Polsby (1980, p. 45) states,

11

Just as the

...

Middletown books mark both the beginning and the high point of an
earlier era in the study of community power, the work of Floyd
Hunter dominates the contemporary scene. 11

For although

numerous critics have underscored what they consider
methodological pitfalls, Hunter's (1953) examination of leadership
and power relations in Regional City remains a major point of
reference for much of today's power-related research.
In keeping with the traditional stratification theory,
Hunter (p. 79) contends that Regional City was run by 11 a small group of
powerful men who interacted socially and determined policy
informally and behind the scenes.

The test for admission to

this circle of decisionmakers, is almost wholly a man's
position in the business community in Regional City.

11

Political

and civic leaders, Hunter explains, were subordinate to the
economic-based power elite, which made basic policy decisions.
Even the governor of the state was controlled by economic
interests, Hunter states.

11

As the investigation proceeded, it

19

became apparent that an economic elite member was the power
behind the governor.

0

Like the governor, other politicians

were subordinated to the economic power elite, Hunter
contends.

Also, he outlines a "division of labor" in which the

topmost leaders, comprising of men with important economic
connections, made basic policy decisions.

"The men in the

understructure of power become the doers and are activated
by the..-policymakers--the initiators, 11 Hunter (p. 100) writes.
He also states that:
Membership in the top brackets of one of the stable
economic bureaucracies is the surest road to power,
and this road is entered into by only a few.
Organizational leaders are prone to get the publicity;
the upper echelon economic leaders the power.

(pp. 86-87)

Additionally, Hunter claims that the dominance of the economic
elite in Regional City was most strongly reflected in public
policy, and that any perceived challenge to the status quo in
Regional City was counteracted with warnings, intimidations, threats,
and in extreme cases, violence.

He further contends that in

instances the method of suppressing challenge may have included
isolation from all sources of support for the individual,
including his job, and therefore his income.
The principle of divide and rule, Hunter claims, was as
applicable in the community as it was in larger units of political
patterning.
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New Haven, Connecticut
The New Haven study by Dahl (1961) aimed specifically at
explaining events relating to the making and executing of public
·policy in several issue areas, including public education, urban
redevelopment and political nominations.

Like the Lynds, Hunter

and other power theorists, Dahl's ultimate goal was to determine
if anyone governed in the community, and if so, who.
A~

previously mentioned, Dahl contends that New Haven was

run by no one particular group, but rather by many different
groups.

In the three issue areas he examined, for example,

Dahl reportedly finds "little overlap" among elites in these areas
of public controversy and decision-making.

With each area, he

finds that leaders and subleaders are recruited to provide
support and legitimacy for public decisions within the specialized
constituencies affected by these policies.

11

Equilibrium or balance

is provided by New Haven's Mayor Richard C. Lee, who integrates
these quasi-independent coalitions in support of his administration's
programs."

Lee, according to Dahl (pp. 200-205), operated as a

"broker or middleman;" and was the focal point of an

11

executive-

centered11 set of coalitions or alliances.
Although Dahl contends that a distant political stratum
exists, he did emphasize that these elites were penetrable,
heterogenous, and often disagree on issues.

In addition, Dahl

(p. 72) claims that there was no such thing as a "covert elite of
economic notables,

11

directing public policy in New Haven.
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Instead, decisions rested with New Haven's executive, Governor Lee,
who is an elected official "theoretically" responsible to the
electorate.
"In talking with a good many businessmen in New Haven I have
found that even with respect -to decisions in which they have
participated, often they are extremely vague as to what actually
transpired," Dahl (1967, p. 144) writes.

The author therefore

refutes any suggestion that businessmen dominate community policies
f'

in New Haven.

According to Dahl, New Haven, like most communities,

had a community fund drive that was carried on mainly by young
businessmen who were looking for a chance to "make a mark as gogetters" and to acquire some recognition and prestige.
As for public schools, these institutions were dominated not
by businessmen, but other groups, Dahl (1967, p. 144) contends.
According to the author, "If there is anything in the community
in which businessmen are involved in it is urban redevelopment."
Yet by and large New Haven's businessmen did not even dominate
this area of community life.

It was the "strong" executive,

Mayor Dilworth or Mayor Lee, who provided the leadership on
redevelopment.
In summarizing his findings on New Haven Dahl emphasizes
that citizens do not rule the system as political equals, neither
does a unified elite control decisions, ar least not in New Haven.
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Therefore, "In a political system where nearly every adult may vote
but knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and
other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?"
(Dahl, 1961, p. 1).
Appalachia's Clear Fork Valley
Gaventa's (1980) empirical study of Clear Fork Valley, Appalachia,
contrasts sharply with Dahl's pluralist analysis of New Haven.
Gaventa's Clear Fork Valley is characterized

by "stark

incongruity --the coexistence of massive natural wealth, chiefly
11

coal and land, and pervasive human poverty.

Besides, unemployment

limited education, malnutrition, coal mining hazards, and
ecological ruin play havoc amid the abundance of wealth.

"This

has been the region's status quo under decades of domination by a
British company and its absentee owners.

Despite these desperate

conditions and frequently violent union struggles . . . acquiescence
to this status quo has been maintained" (Wood, introduction to Gaventa).
In his attempt to explain the sociopolitical· atrocities in
Clear Fork Valley, Gaventa states that:
In situations of inequality, the political response of the
deprived may be seen as a function of power relationships.
Power works to develop and maintain the quiescence of the
powerless.

Rebellion, as a corollary, may emerge as

power relationships are altered.

Together, patterns

of power and powerlessness can keep issues from arising
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grievances from being voiced, and interests from being
recognized.

(pp. vi-vii)

According to the author, this has been the situation in Clear
Fork Va 11 ey.

A sma 11, but powerful, group of i ndi vi duals contra 1

the community's major economic, political and social institutions,
which are virtually impenetrable and closed to the masses.
Based on this finding, Gaventa (p. 41) has rejected
pluralist rmethodology as a feasible alternative for analyzing
community power structure.

"By assuming an open system in which

people could participate and would if they had grievances, this
view (the pluralist's) must place explanation for nonparticipation in value-laden allegations about non-participants
themselves.

11

The opportunity for

p~rticipation

in decision-making in Clear

Fork Valley was, at the time Gaventa did his study, non-existent.
Like Hunter's Regional City, perceived challenge to Clear Fork
Valley's status quo, Gaventa states, was met with warnings, intimidations, threats, and in some cases violence.

Therefore, the

"culture of silence 11 developed and sustained in this region must
not be blamed on the political inefficacy, cynicism, ignorance, or
apathy of the masses--the powerlessness--but rather on the strong
influence of the power-weilding elite.

Like Hunter and the Lynds,

Gaventa (p. 41) contends that community power, at least in Clear
Fork Valley, is of "a hierarchical, clearly stratified nature. 11
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Critique and Summary of the Pluralist, Elitist Theories
Apart from noting that the Lynds' study is the

11

01 de st sti 11-

standi ng landmark" among community studies, Polsby (1980, p. 14) also
contends that this classic work is unique, and in many ways the best
in ·its category.

According to Polsby, all five generations

which characterize stratification analyses of community power are
set forth in the Lynds' research, "accompanied by a wealth of
circumstantial detail."
These generalizations to which the author refers are that
stratification theorists contend that (i) the upper class rules
in local community life; (ii) political and civic leaders are
subordinate to the upper class; (iii) the upper-class power elite
rules in its own interest; (iv) social conflict takes place between
the upper and lower classes; and (v) a single rules in the
community (Polsby, 1980, pp. 8-13).
Unlike the elitists, pluralists claim that in any given
society several pyramids of power are likely to exist simultaneously. Alex de Tocqueville, according to Polsby, (p. 118) views
society as "a congeries of infinite small special interest groups, with
widely differing power bases, and a multitude of techniques for
exercising influence on decisions salient tothem. 11

Similarly,

Polsby (1959, p. 235) himself states that "Presumably people participate in those areas they care about most.

Their values, eloquently

expressed by their participation cannot, it seems to me, be more
effectively objectified."
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But from the elitists' standpoint, such views are a warped
perception of the realities of community power structure.

By

focusing on behavior--doing, participation--and not upon sources
of power, pluralists assume that decision-making arenas, in which
participation is likely to occur, are accessible to everyone,
Gaventa states.

A glaring example of this assumption is Polsby s

(1980, p. 118) assertion that

1

11

in the decision-making of fragmented

government . . . the claims of small intense minorities are usually
attended to. 11
Also alluding to the accessibility of the decision-making
process is Hooks (1979, p. 15) who contends that in democracies,
there are

11

plural sources of opinion, 11 greater interplay

and interactions, more input from more sources, and at
the very least, a legally recognized opposition to the positions
expressed by the official holders of power.
In addition to assuming that groups and individuals have
ample access to the decision-making arena, pluralists, by using
participation as the yardstick for measuring power, also presume
that grievances are recognized and acted upon.

However,

as Gaventa and others have deomonstrated, a mobilization
of bias may not only preempt participation, but
also create 11 a culture of silence 11 --the thwarting of the development of consciousness among the powerless, thus lending to the
dominant order an air of legitimacy.
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In support of this opinion Hawley and Wirt (1974, p. 172)
argue that it has been erroneously assumed that power is solely
reflected in concrete decisions.

Dahl, these authors claim,

excludes the possibility that in the community in question there
might have been a group capable of preventing contests from arising
on issues of importance to it.

Beyond that, however, by ignoring

the "less apparent face of power, 11 Dahl and those who accept his
plural is~ approach are unable to adequately differentiate between
a 11 key 11 and a "routine 11 political decision.
Continuing their criticism of Dahl's work, Hawley and Wirt
(1974) claim that in conceiving of elite domination exclusively in
the form of a conscious cabal

11

exercising the power of decision-

making and vetoeing, he [Dahl] overlooks a more subtle form of
domination; one in which those who actually dominate are not
conscious of it themselves, simply because their position of
dominance has never seriously been challenged.
In addition to viewing community power structure as
polylithic in nature, pluralists also hold that power may be
tied to persistent issues, provoking coalitions among interested
groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to
semi-permanent.

"To presume that the set of coalitions which

exist in the community at any given

tim~

is a timelessley stable

aspect of social structure is to introduce inaccuracies into one's
description of social reality 11 (Polsby, 1960, p. 476).
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John F. Manley is one of the most recent, and perhaps most
severe critic of the pluralist doctrine.
11

Neo-Pluralism:

In an article titled

A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II, 11

Manley (1983, p. 368) claims that, like his colleagues, Dahl has
failed

11

to account for the reality of political and economic

inequality in the United States. 11
In the past several years, however, political and economic
developments in the United States have "placed the pluralist
paradigm under a good deal of strain, 11 Manley notes.

11

Even

inside the pluralist school, serious doubts have arisen about the
theory's ability to explain the American system

11

(Manley, 1983, p. 368).

Manley contends as well that, despite the "generally
favorable response" to pluralists' critique of elitism and class
analysis, "strong doubts" have arisen, too, about the relationship
between pluralism and such central issues of democratic theory
as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful social change.
One major consequence of these developments in the pluralist
camp is what Manley (p. 369) describes as the movement to the
leading pluralists such as Dahl and Lindblom.

11

left 11 of

These two men,

Manley contends, probably have done more than anyone else in the
past 30 years to modernize the theory of pluralism.

"Dahl and

Lindblom have been so disturbed by the system's performance that
they have issued radical-sounding calls for major structural
reforms and redistribution of wealth and income, and have even
questioned the capitalist system itself. 11
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As a result of this "leftward movement," Manley explains,
scholars of community power now talk of a theory called 11 new 11
or

11

postpluralism. 11

According to Manley, the modifications

advocated for the original pluralist theory are so profound
that one can clearly see the evolution of a new theory-Plural ism II--constantly eating away at the very foundation upon
which the former doctrine--Pluralism I--rests.
"Pluralism II now calls into serious question much of what
generations of American political scientists have taught and
believed is true about pluralist democracy in the United States 11
(p. 369).

Despite this development, Manley suggests that what

is needed is not Pluralism II, but rather a new non-pluralistic
theory that better fits the realities of political and economic
power in the United States.
Indications are that the debate on power and the related
elitist/pluralist controversy will continue through the 20th
century and beyond.

This study makes no attempt to lay to

rest this long-standing issue.

However, it is hoped that

the numerous theories and findings presented in this chapter
will at least provide the background against which an
objective analysis of the case of the OUC coal-fired plant
can be made.
The finding of a local power elite, deciding the fate of a
major energy project and its effects on thousands of customers,
might not be the most earthshaking empirical revelation of this
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work.

Undoubtedly, though, the case in question will not only

facilitate better understanding of the concepts discussed, but in
addition, it will generate further inquiry into the nature of
community politics--how issues develop or are prevented from
developing, who participates, who gains from a decision, who
prevails in decision-making, and how they prevail.

CHAPTER II
THE OUC CASE FOR A NEW COAL-FIRED PLANT
The OUC System Description
The OUC operates, maintains and controls the electric and
power utilities serving the city of Orlando and portions of the
metropolitap area outside the city limits.

Presently, the system

is served by the Highland and Indian River gas and oil-fired plants,
two combustion turbines located at Lake Highland and a 13-megawatt
share of the Crystal River nuclear plant.
electrical output is 750 megawatts.

The system's total

The OUC transmission system

consists of 15 substations, 181 miles of high-voltage transmission
line and cable, 792 miles of primary distribution line and cable,
and five high-voltage interconnections with other utilities (OUC,
1981, p. 1, 1-1).
The OUC generating units, which are 98 percent dependent on
oil and natural gas for fuel, served an average of 74,200
residential customers and 10,300 general-service customers in
19~0

(OUC, 1981, p. 2).

According to OUC's classification, the

general-service demand sector, which is the utility's largest
sector, is composed mainly of large commercial customers,
i nc 1udi ng a

11

few 11 heavy i ndust r i a 1 users .
30

I n 19 80 , c omme re i al
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customers accounted for 49 percent of OUC's energy sales, the
residential sector, the second largest user of OUC's power,
accounted for approximately 42 percent of the utility's
electricity.

The remaining 9 percent of the power generated

by the system was bought by small commercial enterprises--generalservice-nondemand sector (OUC, 1981, p. 2).
Establishing Need for Additional Capacity
Convinced that

OUC'~

existing generating capacity would not

be adequate to meet future energy demands in the Orlando area,
OUC consulting engineers, Black and Veatch, which had previously
undertaken

11

long-range 11 power-need studies for the utility in

1978, recommended that the Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center be

bu i 1t.
Like similar studies conducted in previous years, the study
from which the Stanton plant idea evolved, was designed to
appraise the electricity demands of the utility's service area,
assess the company's ability to meet these demands·, and most
importantly, to explore possibilities of providing customers with
a more reliable and cheaper source of power than those currently
being used.

After an "exhaustive analytic process," Black

and Veatch,' OUC consultants for over 30 years, recommended
the construction of a new coal-fired plant as the most viable
alternative to existing oil-burning facilities (H. Smith,
personal communication, January 23, 1985).
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According to OUC spokesman Harold Smith, the Black and
Veatch decision was largely influenced by the rapid growth
predicted for the Orlando area, and the state of Florida in
general.

11

Smith said.

Growth was not an issue years ago; not so anymore,"
Besides, the increased volatility of the oil

market since the mid-1970s further convinced the OUC consultants
that a switch from oil to coal would not only be cheaper but also
be more rel table, Smith explains (Smith, personal communication,
January 23, 1985) discussed in detail later in this chapter.
The "exhaustive analytic" study undertaken by the Kansasbased Black and Veatch firm, involved the use of a "complex,
sophisticated end-use model. 11
met~odology

In general, the 11 end-use 11

requires breaking down the load into customer classes

and end uses, and projecting future loads based on changes in
number of customers, end uses and energy usage patterns.

For

each customer class and end use, load projections were made for the
years 1981 through 2000 (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-2).
These projections, according to OUC, took into consideration
factors such as growth in number of customers in each class,
change in saturation rate for each end use, increases in appliance
efficiencies, improvement in home and business insulation and
weatherization, and other conservation
voluntarily employed by customers.

me~sures

expected to be

33

Equally fundamental to the OUC forecast was the Florida
Public Service Commission 1 s conservation goals, which primarily
call for programs to reduce the use of oil by 25 percent by
1989 (OUC, 1981, p. 1, 2-1).
But perhaps the dominant force determining the outcome of
the OUC power analyses was what the commission describes as a
11

reliability requirement. 11

must

mainta~n

This requirement states that OUC

a minimum of 25 percent reserve energy at all times,

a company official explains.

Using the historical annual load

growth of 4.4 percent for the 1971 through 1980 period, OUC
officials contended that the reserve margin would drop below
the required level by 1987, and by 1992 it would be insufficient
to meet peak demand with any of the three largest OUC units out
of service (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-1).
11

As the OUC system peak demands have grown and the reserve

margins of neighborhood utilities have shrunk, an adequate
reserve margin has become a necessity, both to supply reliable
power to OUC customers and to maintain inter-ties with other
utilities 11 (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-1).
Reliability analyses performed with RELCOMP, a nationallyrecognized reliability computer system, revealed that OUC
peak demand has grown substantially--at an average annual
increase of 8.3 percent--over the last 20 years, compared to
an annual 4.4 percent prior to the early 1960s.

According

to RELCOMP, peak demand in summer 1960 stood at 102 megawatts,
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while in winter 1980 it was 500 megawatts.

And although peak

demand varies widely due to extreme weather conditions and
customer reactions at the time of peak, OUC forecasters
predicted that the increasing trend will continue.

Table 1

provides detailed illustration of OUC 1 s historical peak demand
and net system of energy.
These rising demands, Black and Veatch concluded, could be
adequately met by building a coal-fueled generator station, the
Stanton Energy Center.

This decision, according to an OUC

spokesman, came after their consultants considered several
different alternatives to oil-generating electricity.
Among other things, Black and Veatch considered expansion
of the OUC oil-burning Indian River plant, an alternative that
would violate the 1978 Federal Power and Industrial Fuel Act,
which prohibits the building of new power plants using natural
gas or oil as primary fuels.

Purchasing power from other

utilities, converting existing oil-burning units to burn 100
percent coal as well as coal-oil mixture, and using advanced
technologies to reduce energy consumption were other alternatives
examined (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 5-1).
A nuclear plant, an OUC official explains, was ruled out as
a viable alternative "because it would be extremely costly."
Cost overruns for nuclear plants are usually in the billions,
the OUC spokesman states.
attributed to

11

The exorbitant prices have been

regulatory delays and lack of a clear

natio~al
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TABLE 1
HISTORICAL PEAK DEMAND AND NET SYSTEM ENERGY

Summer
Peak
Demand
MW

Net
System
Energy**
GWH

Load
Factor***
percent

Winter

Winter
Peak
Demand
MW

1971

310

1,480

54.4

1971-72

270

1972

352 ,

1,677

54.4

1972-73

342

1973

400

1,893

54.0

1973-74

363

1974

379

1,787

53.8

1974-75

345

1975

385

1,867

55.4

1975-76

410

1976

406

1,919

54.0

1976-77

468

1977

435

2,055

53.9

1977-78

430

1978

433

2,149

56.7

1978-79

454

1979

452

2,207

55.7

1979-80

500

1980

487

2,329

'54.6

1980-81

535

Year

**Net system energy is composed of OUC customer consumption plus
system losses.
***Based on summer peak demand.
Source:

OUC,

11

Need for Power. 11
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policy regarding the role of nuclear power in our country."
To support this claim, OUC noted that since 1972, 100 nuclear
plants have been cancelled, and that no new ones started since
1978 (Smith, personal communication, January 23, 1985).
In a recent article titled, "Nuclear Follies" James Cook
(1985) contends:
The failure of the U.S. nuclear power programs ranks as
the

l~rgest

managerial disaster in business history, a

disaster on a monumental scale.

The utility industry

has already invested $125 billion in nuclear power, with
an additional $140 billion to come before the decade is
out, and only the ·blind, or the biased, can now think
that most of the money has been well spent.

It is a

defeat for the U.S. consumer and for the comptetitiveness
of U.S. industry, for the utilities that undertook the
program and for the private enterprise system that made
it possible.

Without even recognizing the risks, the

U.S. e 1ectri c power industry undertook a commitment
bigger than the space program ($100 billion) or Vietnam
($111 billion) and in little more than a decade,
transformed what elsewhere in the world is a low-cost,
reliable, environmentally impeccable ·form of energy into
a power source that is not only ·high in cost and
unreliable but perhaps not even safe.

(p. 83)
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The foregoing analyses, plus the results of individual
evaluations and economic comparisons of the various alternatives
which convinced the OUC consultants that their proposed Plan I,
which includes the installation of the Stanton Energy Unit by
1987, "is the lowest cost alternative for the OUC system."

The

next lowest cost alternative on a "cumulative present-worth
basis" was plan III, which includes the conversion of Indian
River Unit III to burn coal.

According to Black and Veatch, the

cumulative present-worth costs for Plan III are 4.6 percent
greater than those of Pl.an I on an annual basis (OUC, 1981, p. 5,
0-1).

According to company sources, OUC plans to install an
additional three units as needed to the Stanton Energy Center
over the next 20 years.

The additions will boost the system's

total electrical output to 2,000 megawatts.
OUC's Justification for Building the Stanton Power Center
Apart from underscoring the economic advantages of
switching from oil to coal-generated power, OUC and its
consultants enumerated several other reasons . the change of energy
source was necessary.

Growth, fuel independence, fuel diversity,

firm capacity, and plant replacement were delineated as
reasons which justified the building of the Stanton Center.
Noting that Orlando is among the 50 largest metropolitan
areas in the United States today, OUC officials argue that a
facility like Stanton was needed to ensure an ample supply of
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cheap energy to meet anticipated increase in electricity demands.
This projected rise in power demand was predicated upon rapid
growth.

Orlando, OUC officials contend, is one of the fastest-

growing areas in the nation, and is "already being hailed as an
emerging premiere."

Besides, the city is

11

in the middle of" one

of the fastest growing states, a state predicted to have the third
largest population in the nation by the year 2001.

"There is no

question that the plant is needed for growth," officials conclude
(OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5).
OUC also argues that if adequate preparation were not made
for the anticipated growth, there would be power shortages in its
service area by 1991.

Therefore, to ward off this impending

danger, and to satisfy state requirement of maintaining a 25
percent reserve capacity, the utility decided to move with full
speed to build the coal-fired plant.

According to OUC officials,

the utility is currently "deficient in firm capacity at times
of peak demand. 11

If its large unit went out, the OUC system

would have to buy power at "tremendously increased" costs to
customers (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5).
Another reason cited as justification for building the
Stanton Energy Center is fue 1 diversity, which wil 1 11 enab1 e OUC
to take advantage of market conditions and· base its power supply
on the most economical fuel mix" (OUC Bulletin, 1981, p. 5).
In addition to the need for fuel diversity, the new coalfired plant, OUC officials claim·, was a necessary replacement
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for some of the utility•s existing facilities which will soon be
obsolete.

Already, OUC has shut down its Lake Highland power

plant operation, and the Indian Ri ver generating unit, which has
a l ife expectancy of 30 years, will be 28 years old when Stanton
goes into operation in 1987 (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5).
Economic Benefits
Perhaps the most convincing arguments advanced by OUC as
justification' for construe-ting the Stanton Center are those
revolving around economic benefits.

In fact, when the Florida

Public Service Commi"ssion (FPSC) certif i ed the need for the pl.ant,
it explained that the primary reason it had given OUC the
permission to begfn construction of the power facility was
because of the "s i gni fi cant economic benefits
from the project.

11

•••

11

that woul.d result

While it was not likely that the new

plant would result in 'an absolute 1 reduction in rates, the
electrical bills would be lower than they would be if Stanton
were not constructed or if any other alternative were exercised,"
FPSC stated (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 9).
According to the FPSC--the federal agency responsible for
plant certification--the Stanton Energy Center would benefit not
only OUC customers, but also peninsular Florida by providing 11 an
alternative to costly oil-fired power.

11

Fuel oil, OUC officials

state, now costs 10 times more than it did in 1973 before the oil
embargo staged by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).

Last summer, for example, residual fuel cost
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$29.25 a barrel.

11

That price would have to drop $12 or $13 a

barrel--more than half--for the price of oil to be as low as the
delivered price of coal purchased for the new plant" (Ibid, p. 5).
OUC cost estimates further indicate that the new coal-fired plant
is· expected to displace 3.75 million barrels of oil annually, and
that each trainload of coal for the Stanton plant is expected to
save approximately $500,000 in fuel costs.

This means that by

1987, annual savings to the OUC system, due to the installation of
Stanton Energy Center Unit I, should range from $10 million in the
first year to $57 million in 1991.

These savings in fuel costs will

be passed on directly to OUC's 92,000 consumers (OUC Bulletin, 1984,
p. 9).

According to an Orlando Sentinel article, this large dollar
amount translates into a savings of $14.41 a month for the typical
residential customer in the first year of Stanton's operation, and
to $56.40 per month by 1991.

However, in 1978 when OUC made these

projections, oil prices were higher than they were when construction
of the power plant began years later.

Therefore, with falling oil

prices, the utility's projected savings have shrunk.

OUC now admits

that instead of 1987, customers will not see a reduction of their
electricity bulls until after 1989, and these savings will be small
compared with the original projections--$2 .. 67 on a monthly bill in
1989 (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983,
p. Al, A14).

The projected residual fuel-oil and delivered-coal prices

from 1981 to 2000 are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.
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TABLE 2
PROJECTED RESIDUAL FUEL OIL PROCES 1981 THROUGH 2000

r

Year

Price
$/MBtu

1981

4.68

1982

4.93

1983

5.68

1984

6.36

1985

7.39

1986

8.45

1987

9.35

1988

11.16

1989

12.98

1990

14.84

1991

15.82

1992

17.70

1993

18.74

1994

20.68

1995

21. 73

1996

23.70

1997

25.83

1998

27.73

1999

29.80

2000

32.02
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TABLE 3
PROJECTED DELIVERED COAL PRICES

Year

Price
$/MBtu

1981

2.06

1982

2.29

1983

2.55

1984

2.82

1985

3.12

1986

3.44

1987

3.81

1988

4.21

1989

4.65

1990

5.14

1991

5.67

1992

6.26

1993

6.92

1994

7.63

1995

8.43

1996

9.31

1997

10.29

1998

11.38

1999

12.58

2000

13.92
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The oil-price projections are based on OUC's actual 1980 cost of
$3.5MBtu and estimated escalation.

Real escalation--price

movements relative to the general rate of inflation--for the
1980 through 2000 period is the same as that used in "Forecast
Analysis Fuel" in 1980 for Tampa Electrical Company, OUC sources
indicated (OUC, 1981, p. Bl, 2-1).
Noting that precise future price movement of residual-fuel
oil cannot be rpredicted because of volatile global market conditions,
OUC argued that long-term trends are an invaluable instrument for
analyzing oil prices.

"Price increases have followed fairly

constant historical long-term trends.

During certain years, for

example 1973, the prices have taken a step increase then resumed
the normal trend of increases" (OUC, 1981, p. Bl.3).
In the case of coal, price projections for a 20-year period
were based on "current expected delivered costs with free-on-board
(FOB) mine and transportation costs escalated separately."
According to the latest published delivered-coal cost for the
state of Florida, the average cost for November 1980 was $1.80
per MBtu.

Delivered-coal costs are the sum of the FOB mine

price for the coal, plus the transportation costs, assumed to be
35 percent of the delivered-coal costs.

This assumption, OUC

claims, is based on current coal and transportation costs from
the Illinois basin and Southern Appalachian Region .(OUC, 1981, p. 82.2). ·
Contending that coal prices are not as volatile as those of
oil, and that future coal prices should follow projected trends,
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OUC is confident that the switch from oil to coal will be a sound
economic decision from which the utility and its customers will
benefit--a hope shared by the FPSC.
Sentinel article,

11

For according to an Orlando

The only reason state officials are letting

the Orlando Utilities Commission build a coal-fired power plant
is the be 1 i ef that coa 1 wil 1 remain cheaper than oil 11

· (

Nesbitt,

Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983, p. A14).
Economic rbenefits aside, OUC contends there was still another
good reason the Stanton Energy Center was needed--fuel independence.
11

The 1970s,

11

OUC states,

11

taught us a costly lesson.

We were energy

hostages then because of our reliance on imported oil (OUC
Bulletin, 1984, p. 5).
The OPEC oil embargoes to which OUC alludes, sent oil prices
sharply upwards in 1973--the cost per barrel of residual-fuel
oil increased to over 10 times its per-barrel price prior to the
Arab-dominated embargoes.

With the still troubled situation in

the Middle East, it is only wise to reduce dependency on that
region as a source of fuel, OUC argues.

The coal-fired Stanton

Energy Center, utility officials contend, was the most costeffective way to ensure a steady supply of power.
Furthermore, OUC claims that the elimination of the
estimated 3,750,000 barrels of oil annually will not only
reduce OUC's dependency on foreign oil by 21 percent, but will
also 11 aid Florida's efforts to achieve the statewide 50 percent
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oil reduction by 1990, 11 as established by the federal government
(OUCs advertisement, (The Orlando Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p. A9).
To strengthen its

11

reliability 11 and

11

independence 11

arguments, OUC also stresses that coal mined in America is a
more reliable source of power than foreign oil.
11

OUC will purchase

high-grade 11 coal at $76 a ton from Kentucky when Stanton begins

operation.
trains, two

The coal will be delivered to the plant in unit
o~

three times a week.

Over one million tons of

coal is expected to be needed annually.

Tom Washburn, an OUC

planner, states that transportation cost represents 30 percent-almost $23--of the $76 the utility will pay for a ton of coal
(Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983, p. Al4).
Legal Procedures, Management and Financing
Having established the need for the Stanton Energy Center and
having crossed the FPSC certification hurdle, the OUC moved on to
arguing its case before other federal, state and local agencies,
responsible for reviewing and or approving the certi·fication
application, or other documentation for the plant.

In all, 16

agencies, including the Florida Department of Environmental
Regulation (DER), the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Power Plant Siting Board, were involved.

Basically, through a

series of public meetings, these agencies were charged with two
major responsibilities:

(i) to determine if the proposed site

for the plant complied to existing land-use plans and zoning

46

ordinances, and (ii) to determine if the new plant would cause any
environmental hazards.

All 16 agencies ruled in favor of the

plant on both areas of concern.
The operation safeguards of the plant are "technically
sufficient for the protection and welfare of the citizens of
Florida," the DER concluded (OUC BUlletin, 1984, p. 9).
Similarly, Joseph W. Landers, former executive director
of the DER states that:
~

Because the Stanton Energy Center will be a new source,
it must meet pollution control requirements much more
stringent than existing sources.

It has been clearly

demonstrated throughout the entire regulatory process
that the plant will, in fact, meet these very strict
requirements.

The plant will utilize sewage effluent

for cooling water--a definite plus for the Central
Florida area with its waste water disposal problems.
From an environmental standpoint, this plant is clean,
absolutely clean (OUC advertisement, The Orlando Sentinel,
August 28, 1984, p. A9).
In addition to the favorable evaluations of government agencies
and officials, data from other independent researchers and utility
plants have reinforced OUC's argument that the coal-fired facility
will be environmentally safe.

One such independent view claims

that "No one can show any effects on the soils from acid rain.
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One application of fertilizers will have more effect on soil
acidity than a year of acid rain (OUC advertisement, The Orlando
Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p A9).
But neither these independent findings nor the DER's report-based on the recommendations of the 15 other agencies--marked the
end of the mandatory legal steps the OUC had to take prior to construction of its coal-fired plant.
hearings

wer~

In March 1982, more public

conducted, after which a certification officer studied

the application for an additional eight months, OUC records show.
On November 12, 1982, the hearing officer handed down his
findings:
A balance is struck between the need for the
facility and the environmental impact resulting from
its construction and operation . . • the coal-fired
electrical plant is capable of providing abundant
low cost electrical energy and will produce minimal
adverse effects on the environment (OUC advertisement,
The Orlando Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p. A9).
Following this report, Governor Bob Graham and the Cabinet
voted unanimously on December 14, 1982 to approve the application
of the Stanton Energy Center.

About a year later, October 1983,

OUC began construction of its electrical power facility, the
largest and perhaps the most modern in the state of Florida.
The new power plant was to be equipped with approximately
$100 million worth of state-of-the-art environmental protection
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systems, and is therefore expected to be cleaner than older, oilfired plants in the state (OUC,' 1984, Information Bulletin, p. 3).
Included in these systems are:
a 10-storey electrostatic precipitator, designed
to remove fly ash, soot. and other particulate matter
from combustion gases before they are released in the
air;
a

12-s~orey

wet limestone scrubber designed to remove

sulphur dioxide from the combustion .gases

~ hrough

a

chemical process;
a 43-storey cooling tower designed to use waste
water for coo 1 i·ng;
a 55-storey chimney;
a 569,000-horsepower turbine generator;
a 23-storey boiler building; and
a 93-acre pond to hold make-up water for cooling
water (OUC, 1984, Information Bulletin, p. 3).
Of the 415 megawatts of power generated by these additional
facilities, OUC will own 333.5 megawatts, 100 of which Florida
Power and Light (FPL) has contracted to buy for 15 years.

The

remaining 81.5 megawatts have been contracted for purchase by
the cities of Kissimmee, Vero Beach, Fort Pierce, Lake Worth,
Homestead and Starke (OUC, 1984, OUC Today, p. 1).
Under the management of Black and Veatch Engineers,
construction of the Stanton Center has been proceeding as originally
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planned, an OUC spokesman states.

According to Smith, a

controversy sparked by critics of the plant did slow down
the certification and approval process, but did not induce any
change in architectural design, management procedures, or
financing.

"Fighting an opposition was a diversion, but as far

as our plans are concerned nothing has changed," Smith states
(Smith, personal communication, January 23, 1985).
A recent~

progress

report indicated that a total of 66

contractors and subcontractors have been engaged during the
first year of construction.

Of these contractors, 46 are from

central Florida, and 14 are from out of state.

Also, by

October 1984, 554 workers had been employed on the site, on-site
employment is expected to peak at 1,100 by

mid-~985

(OUC Progress

Review, 1984, p. 2).
To finance the ongoing activities at the Stanton Center, OUC
sold $250 million in bonds and borrowed $280 million, for a total
of $530 million--the original estimated cost of the plant (OUC
Today, 1984, p. 2).

M. G. Lewis and Co. of Winter Park, OUC's

financial advisors, took responsibility for marketing the bonds.
About 75 bankers were chosen to sell the bonds (Nesbitt, Simmons,
The Orlando Sentinel, 1984, November 15, pp. Al, A6).
Commenting on the success of this venture, OUC officials
state that they were able to sell their bonds quickly, and at a
lower interest rate than others because of their "high credit"
rating (OUC Today, 1984, p. 2).
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The $280 million loan, OUC sources indicate, was negotiated
with Morgan Trust Company of New York, and was the largest
commitment Morgan had ever made to a municipal utility.

Also

participating in the transaction were Sun Bank NA and Barnett
Banks, each of which contributed $25 million.

OUC estimates

the average interest on the $280 million at 9 percent (OUC, 1984,
OUC Today, p. 2).
The utiJity claims that its ability to raise the money needed
for the Stanton Center as easily as it did as "a significant
accomplishment and is evidence of the financial stability and
history of sound management that characterizes OUC (OUC, 1984,
OUC Today, p. 2).
In addition to being proud of its fund-raising abilities, OUC .
also reports that the total estimated cost of the plant now stands
at $511 million--down $19 million from the $530 million originally
estimated in January, 1980.

Table 4 illustrates the changing cost

estimates from 1980 through 1984.
to factors such as:

OUC attributes the reduced costs

lower inflation, "soft market" conditions in the

power plant construction and equipment supply industries; the OUC's
"unique wage-stabilization agreement--fixing salaries for the 4-year
construction period--and optimal design of facility (OUC, 1984,
Progress Review, p. 1).
With the wage stabilization agreement, there is only a small
chance of cost overruns, OUC contends.

"The only thing that could

cause the dramatic kinds of cost overruns that the public might
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TABLE 4
COST-ESTIMATE HISTORY OF THE STANTON ENERGY CENTER

Date

Total Project
Cost Estimate

Projected Commercial
Operation Date

Source of
Estimate

Jan. 1980

566,102,000

March 1986

Site Selection
Study

535,058,000

Nov. 1986

Official Cost
Estimate

May 1981

546,471,000

Nov. 1986

Need Hearing

Sept. 1982

550,925,000

Late 1986

Summary of Need
and Costs

Spring 1983

556,368,000

Sept. 1987

B&V Economic
Evaluation

Nov. 1983

530,216,000

Sept. 1987

Official Cost
Estimate

August 1984

511,069,000

July 1987

Official Cost
Estimate

Sept. 1980
;-

Source:

Prepared for OUC by Black and Veatch
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fear would be delaying construction of this plant (OUC, 1984,
Progress Review, p. 3).
Apart from reporting that the cost of the Stanton Energy Center
is down 10 percent, OUC states that the project is ahead of schedule.
According to Progress Review, the current schedule calls for the plant
to be in operation by July 1987, instead of September as previously
planned.

11

This acceleration in schedule is especially significant

since, for each month that this plant comes in early during this
period of the year, fuel cost savings can reach $6 million . . .
because of the cost differential between coal and oil, 11 OUC claims
(OUC, 1984, Progress Review, p. 1).
In essence, OUC's justification for building its power plant
at this particular time revolves around savings and reliability.

As

discussed in this chapter, company officials contend that if Stanton
Energy Center Unit I were not constructed by 1992, when the OUC
system will require additional capacity, the system's reliability
as a source of electricity will be significantly reduced.

In

addition, the delay of the center past its earliest possible
commercial operation date will result in higher energy prices for
OUC customers, OUC argues.

According to company estimates, the

comparative annual costs would be 5.7 percent higher in 1987, and
as much as 21.1 percent higher in 1991 if Stanton were delayed.
In other words, the plant would cost consumers an additional $84.7
million over its 30-year lifespan (OUC, 1984, Progress Review, p 1).
Finally, not constructing the coal-fired plant at the
earliest possible date would result in the consumption of an
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additional 8,000,000 barrels of oil between 1987 and 1991, OUC
contends.
But while OUC continues to produce these impressive statistics,
simultaneously forging ahead with construction of the plant,
there are those who have advanced equally convincing arguments,
challenging the validity of the commission's claims.
Subsequently, a conflict, reaching rancorous proportions,
has evolved Qetween the OUC and several community interest
groups.

CHAPTER III
THE CASE AGAINST THE COAL-FIRED PLANT AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE
Not long after the announcement of the proposed new OUC plant
was made public, opposition surfaced within the community.
Residents, acting individually and in groups, argued that the
power plant, named for retired OUC president, Curtis H. Stanton,
would not only be an unnecessary economic burden for OUC
customers, but would also pose a serious threat to the environment.
Emissions from the new plant would pollute the air, the
opposition environmentalists contend.

Additionally, opponents

of the power facility claimed that

plant was not needed

t~e

because OUC already had more electric power than it needed to
serve its customers.
In addition to questioning the economic need for the Stanton
Energy Center, critics also deplored what they cons.idered OUC's
arbitrary decision to impose upon the community a major potential
polluter without public debate.

Critics argued that the people

in the community should have had a say in determining the need
for the power plant.
These concerns formed the basis of a major controversy
between OUC and its opponents, and also set the stage for
54
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subsequent legal battles which brought the Orlando Utilities
Commission face to face with its adversaries in several public
forums, including the state's highest court.
William Hall, an Orlando resident, began a string of legal
actions brought against OUC.

In October 1982, Hall filed a suit

in an Orange County Court, challenging the utility's right to
offer revenue bonds to help finance the power plant.

Hall, who

had considered buying OUC bonds, said he became concerned when he
could not find any specific authority in the utility's charter to issue
bonds (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 5, 1984, pp. Al, AB).
Not only did this discovery deter him from purchasing the
bonds, but it also prompted him to ask the court to revoke the
decision by the Orange County Circuit Court and the city of
Orlando, granting the OUC permission to issue $700 million in
bonds to help cover the cost of the Stanton plant.
Until May 1984, OUC had issued only $250 million worth of
bonds.

OUC board members decided to get a short-term loan

rather than issue bonds for the total cost of constructing the
Stanton plant, because the utility would have had to pay too high
an interest rate.

Board member Grace Lindblom, who helped

negotiate the bond sale, claims that ·court challenges by
opponents of the plant prevented OUC from getting to the market
earlier (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 26, 1984, pp. Bl, B5).
In his suit, Hall, a retired Air Force officer who is an
active participant in City Hall politics, charged that the special
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1929 charter creating OUC did not give it the authority to issue
bonds.

Contrary to Hall's claim, Judge Lon Cornelius stated that

the utility's decision to issue tax-free revenue bonds was quite
legitimate.

The plaintiff's case was subsequently dismissed (Simmons,

The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, pp. Bl, B6).
But the judge's ruling generated criticism not only from Hall,
but also from other plant opponents, who charged that the court
"sidestepped the issue of whether OUC's charter gives it the authority
to sell bonds," and instead considered only the time the complaint was
filed (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, p. B-1).
Hall filed his suit four months after the bond validation
hearing--two months after the appear period expired.

The

plaintiff maintained that"! don't believe OUC had the right to
-

issue bonds then, and I don't believe it does now" (Ibid).
The bond-issue ruling was only the foretaste of several legal
victories the OUC would be handed by local courts and other
government agencies.

It was only about a month after the Hall

ruling that the hearing officer of the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation recommended that Governor Graham and
the Cabinet approve the Stanton Energy Center.
At this juncture, opposition to the plant heightened.
Orlando resident John Hedrick and about 25 other people-mostly retirees from the College Park area--met informally to
plan a campaign strategy against the OUC power plant.

The new

group, calling itself "The Committee to Stop the Coal Plant,"

5]

agreed on a membership fee of $10 and also on an open-door
membership policy.
Having defined its major goal as "forcing" the Orlando City
Council to put the question of OUC building the coal-fired plant
before voters in a special election, the newly-formed organization
set out to seek the 8,400 signatures--15 percent--of registered
voters needed under city law to force the proposed action.
Accordin~

to city charter, if enough voters sign petitions

endorsing an ordinarice, the city council must approve it within
two weeks or let voters consider it in a special election within
30 days.
After three months of door-to-door campaign, "The Committee
to Stop the Coal Plant," which had changed its name to P.O.W.E.R.
Now (People of Orlando/Orange County Working to Effect Reform
Now) collected more than 12,000 signatures from Orlando residents,
calling for ,a referendum on the Stanton plant P.O.W.E.R. Now presented
the signatures to the Orlando City Council, but was told by city commissioners that "The city of Orlando cannot interfere in the affairs
of the OUC."

Although OUC is owned by the city, it operates autono-

mously (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24, 1984, p. Bl).
"The council has clearly violated the city charter by not
acting on the petition, 11 said P.O.W.E.R. Now founder John Hedrick
(Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24, 1984, p. Bl).
In essence, the proposed referendum questioned the city of
Orlando's participation in the building of the Stanton Energy
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Center.

P.O.W.E.R. Now contended that the OUC could not legally

construct its new plant without voter approval, since the city
is the co-owner of the 3,280-property on which the power facility
is being built.
· According to Mary Cornell, P.O.W.E.R. Now's president, her
organization's action was prompted by the environmental and
economic concerns mentioned earlier in this chapter, and also
by the group's conviction that OUC needed to be more accountable to its
customers (M. Cornell, personal communication, January 17, 1985).
The city commission's failure to respond favorably to the
petition did not dampen the spirits of the OUC critics.
P.O.W.E.R. Now, in collaboration with the Central Florida Young
Republicans, filed a lawsuit in the Orange County Circuit Court to
force the city of Orlando to call a referendum on the Stanton
Energy Center.
The 550-member Young Republicans group offered to join
forces with P.O.W.E.R. Now to fight for a referendum on the plant,
because it "felt very strongly that the matter should go before the
Orlando voters (D. Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985).
Group chairman Doug Guetzlo says that long before his
organization entered the legal battle against OUC, the leadership
of the Young Republicans had been "very concerned" about the impact
the new coal-fired plant would have on the environment.
11

Therefore,

we decided to do what we could to get the issue on the ballot"

(Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985).
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Guetzlo, who says he was not sure his organization would have
initiated the suit against OUC had P.O.W.E.R. Now not done so, also
stated that the joint venture was

11

simply a matter of economics. 11

With both groups teaming up, the legal cost incurred by each was
considerably lower than going it alone would have been.

In total,

the combined legal cost to organizations was $1,200, most of which
was spent on reproducing legal documents and for paying minor court
costs.

The free legal counsel offered by local attorneys contributed

significantly to the opposition's low legal expenditures (Guetzlo,
personal communication, March 6, 1985).
The collaboration between the two groups, however, was shortlived.
11

Once the Circuit Court judge ruled against a referendum,

we quit, our point had been made.

let the people decide.

When

that happened, we felt our mission was fulfilled, 11 Guetzlo states.
He explains from then on, the Young Republicans, a local arm of the
national party organization, "diverted our attention to partisan
efforts (Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985).
In ruling on the proposed referendum, Orange County Circuit
Judge Joe Baker stated that residents "have no authority to block
or influence" construction of the power p1ant through a referendum. 11
Besides, Baker says that "The proposed referendum cannot have any
force or effect under any legal theory.

The legislature has

created Orlando Utilities Commission independent of city government,
with the full, absolute and final right to decide on questions like
this (Spirduso, The Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1984, p. Cl).
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But P.O.W.E.R. Now spokesman Roger Gaines describes Baker's
ruling as "bizarre" and

11

off the wall."

Gaines and his

colleagues argue that Baker did not address the question of
citizen's right to a referendum on the power plant.

Most of the

judge's 36-page opinion was a history of the nation's energy and
electrical use, the debate on coal-versus-oil power, and an
explanation of energy-related topics, critics contend.
;-

11

! was

shocked with the opinion, Gaines says, "It's an essay on the
history of electricity and energy that any eighth-grader can learn.
The question was do we have the right to a referendum? Somewhere
in his ruling he totally lost the argument in this case 1' (McKee, The
Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1983, p. C4).
On the contrary side, OUC attorney Thomas Tart contends that
Baker "tried to paint a whole picture.

These people (OUC critics)

have not won the first battle against us.
de 1ay the process.

They're just trying to

The judge is trying to examine. everything in the

Those people who are complaining are ignorant of the issue of

case.

power in the state.

They've probably never been in a power plant"

(McKee, The Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1983, p. C4).
Despite Judge Baker's ruling, P.O.W.E.R. Now and other
opponents of the Stanton plant persisted in
construction of the project.

~heir

fight to halt

Acting on the advice of their

attorneys, P.O.W.E.R. Now took its request for a referendum on
the power plant to the 5th District Court of Appeal in Daytona
Beach.

In the appeal, the plaintiff asked the court to expedite
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the case or prevent OUC from awarding any more contracts until the
matter was settled in court.

The request for a freeze of all

contracts was denied.
While P.O.W.E.R. Now awaited the 5th District Court of
Appeal 1 s decision on the referendum, the Sierra Club was busy
also filing a suit against OUC, asking that certification need
for the Stanton Energy Center be reopened.
The Sierra Club, an environmental advocacy group, opposed
the power plant for the same reasons P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Young
Republicans had given as justification for their fight.
to Sierra Club attorney Irby Pugh,

11

We wanted to show that the

impact should be weighed with the degree of need.
need, there should be no impact.

According

If there is no

But it (the plant) is going to

have a major environmental impact. 11

Claiming, therefore, that it

missed the only preliminary public hearing at which voters could
have participated in certification proceedings, the Sierra Club
in its suit, asked that the PSC, which approved the plant in 1981,
reopen certification hearings (Pugh, personal communication, October
12, 1984).
While Pugh and his group voiced their complaints, Hall once more
entered the fray, this time appealing his case in the Florida Supreme
Court, but again he lost to OUC.

Hall was ·ordered to reimburse the

utility $1,149.60 to cover the cost of copying legal documents.
Like P.O.W.E.R. now and the Young Republicans, the Sierra
Club also questioned the right of the OUC to exclude the vast
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majority of its customers from participating in the deliberations
determining the fate of the coal-fired plant.

In its separately

filed suit, the Sierra Club contended that it had not been given
the opportunity to argue before government officials the need for
the Stanton power plant (Pugh, personal communication, October 12,
1984).
According to Sierra Club attorney, Pugh, the organization,
which has nattonwide connections, first began opposing the OUC plant
on environmental grounds in 1982 at the promptings of Sierra Club
member Barney Capehart, a University of Florida professor of
economics.

Capehart and his colleagues contend that the power plant

was not needed.

The Sierra Club responded to his argument and

wanted to appear before the state hearing officer and the Florida
Electrical Power Plant Siting Board, made up of the Governor and
Cabinet, to pursue the matter.

They were refused a hearing on the

basis that the Florida State Constitution permits only the PSC to
certify need for a power plant.

Consequently, the Sierra Club,

which had not attended the preliminary PSC hearing on the issue, was
denied a chance to express its view to the hearing officer or the
siting board.

Pugh and his organization admitted that their

failure to appear at the preliminary hearing was "a big mistake."
According to OUC and state law, opponents of the plant "have control
through public hearings on the issue and not at the polls" (Simmons,
The Orlando Sentinel, August 19, 1983, p. Bl).

By missing the hearing,

the Sierra Club forfeited its right to a public voice.
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In handing down its judgment on the Sierra Club's suit, the
5th District Court of Appeal stated that the fact that plant
critics did not argue their case before the agencies certifying the
Stanton Power Center was no basis to prevent the OUC from proceeding
with the project as planned.

The court, according to The Orlando

Sentinel, agreed with a motion filed by OUC, which argued that Pugh's
request for a rehearing should be denied because it did not raise
any new

point~

and was not filed in time.

Rules of legal procedure require motions for rehearing to be
filed within 15 days of the original ruling, and to raise issues
not addressed during the initial appeal.

Tart, who argued in defense

of OUC, said Pugh "re-argued the same old story, 11 filing his motion
afterl9 days (Simmons,_The Orlando Sentinel,August 19, 1983,pp. Cl,Cll).
After its last-ditch attempt to stop construction of the
Stanton power plant failed, the Sierra Club contemplated taking its
case to the Florida Supreme Court.

Upon reconsideration, however,

the organization decided to concede defeat.

Waging the fight all

the way to the Supreme Court "is so expensive, 11 Pugh states "I
think its up to the community now to take up the fight" (Pugh
personal communication, October 12, 1984).
Despite obvious disillusionment over the outcome of the court
suit, and the lack of widespread public support outside of the
few organizations mentioned, Pugh, along with P.O.W.E.R. Now,
joined forces to agitate for legislation to restructure OUC.
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In January 1984, P.O.W.E.R. Now proposed to the Orange County
Legislative Delegation that the charter of OUC be changed "to make
it more accountable" to the Orlando City Council.

To this end, the

organizations suggested that the commission board members be
elected rather than appointed.

Currently, the OUC board nominates

board members for the city-owned utility and the Orlando City
Council can confirm or reject the nominations.
In the past 32 years, the city council has rejected none of
OUC's nominees for board membership (G. Chewning, personal communication, March 17, 1985).

In addition to Mayor Frederick, the current

board is composed of Orange County educator, Royce B. Walden, businesswoman, Grace Lindblom, board president, Wally M. Sanderlin, and vice
president, James H. Pugh Jr.
Apart from proposing an elected board, OUC critics also
called for other changes.

These included disclosure of the

utility's finances, a requirement that OUC could hold public
hearings on projects costing more than $100 million, and that the
city council have more authority over the utility's policy.
P.0.W.E.R Now urged that the changes be adopted to give residents
more control over the OUC (The Orlando Sentinel, January 1984, pp.

Bl, 86).

The decisions made by OUC officers affect all Orlando

residents as much as the decisions that you .made,'.' P.O.W.E.R. Now
spokesman, Roger Gaines told lawmakers.

"Yet Orlando residents have

no say in how the utility is run 11 (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel,
January 17, 1984, p. 86).
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Gaines argues that the city of Orlando

11

ignored 11 the

petition signed by more than 12,000 residents that sought a public
vote on whether OUC should build the $546 million coal-fired plant .
The city justified its action by claiming that it had no juris aiction
over the 0UC ( Ga i nes , person a 1 commu ni cat i on , January 15 , 19 85) .
The proposed changes to the OUC charter would make the utility
commission "more responsive" to its ratepayers, Pugh contends.
According to

~im,

board members under the present system are not

representative of the Orlando community, because they are
from a small group of the city's financial elite.

11

selected

Citizens have

no input in utility decisions" (Spirduso, The Orlando Sentinel,
October 20, 1983, p. C-11).
Despite arguments, the 10 member bipartisan Orange County
legislative delegation unanimously rejected the opponents'
proposed amendments to the OUC charter.

Prior to reaching its

verdict, the delegation was warned by Senator George Stuart that
it was "meddling" in something they knew little about.

"We're the

wrong people to amend the OUC charter, 11 Stuart says, "We don't have
have the staff to study the issues . . . and no experience in the
utility business 11 (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, January 17, 1984,
pp. B-1, B-6).

OUC officials argued that any change in its charter,

particularly a provision for an elected board, would

11

hurt 11 its

financial rating and increase the price of money it needs to borrow to
pay for construction of the plant.

11

It would cost us over $60 million
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for the Stanton plant alone if our credit rating went from AA to
A'' OUC board president Wally Sanderlin said (Simmons, The Orlando
Sentinel, January 17, 1985, p. B-6).
But P.O.W.E.R. Now attorney Marcia Ramsdell, who drafted the
20-page amendment proposal, disputed OUC's claim.

According to

Ramsdell, the amendment protected investors by guaranteeing that
utility rates would remain high enough to cover its debts.

It also

protected the community by providing the public with more and better
information about its operations.

Ramsdell concluded that most of

the opposition from OUC stemmed from its "refusal to give up some of
the power it had gained during its 60 year existence" (Simmons, The
Orlando Sentinel, January 17, 1984, pp. B-1, B-6).
In addition to challenging the present OUC charter, plant
critics have also objected to a federal air permit for the Stanton
plant.

In a letter written in late 1983, Pugh told the regional

officials of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
OUC would not meet a DEcember 10 deadline for starting construction
on the Stanton Energy POwer Center, and asked the EPA to terminate
the air permit.

But according to OUC general manager Harry Luff,

construction on the plant began in October 1983, with site clearing
and testing for the facility's foundation.

However, Pugh claims that

''They have not started building the plant; ·site-clearing work is not
construction" (Giesen, The Orlando Sentinel, November 24, 1983, pp.
D-1, D-10) coal-fired power plant in June 1982, after certifying that
plant emissions would not exceed state and federal air quality limits.
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Opposition to the OUC new power plant was not limited only
to the forementioned groups.

Based on figures presented by the

Sierra Club, other plant critics have concluded that Central
Florida's lakes and streams will become "virtually sterile" from
the pollutants, and that the polluted air and acid rain will cause
lung disease (The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, pp. C-1, C-5).
Furthermore, some environmentalists have expressed concern
about the

imp~ct

of coal dust blowing from trains transporting the

coal to the plant.

The cities of Maitland, Altamonte Springs,

Longwood, Deland, Sanford and the Council of Local Government of
Seminole County all raised objections to the construction of the
power plant.

The cities greatest fear was the heavy coal-dust

residue and major traffic jams, coal trains passing through the
communities would case (Abrahams, The Little Sentinel, November 26,
1982, pp. B-1, B-9).
The line through Maitland is one of the three routes from Jacksonville that will transport coal to the Stanton power plant.

The

other two routes would be via Lakeland and Auburndale.
In addition to the challenges from the various municipalities,
OUC faced protests from local homeowners.

In February 1984, the Isle

of Pines Homeowners Association complained that OUC's railroad crossing
at Narcoosee and Moss Park Roads woud cut across the only entrance to
the 200-home subdivision in Southeast Orange County (The Orlando
nel, February 24, 1984, pp. B-1, B-7).

Se~ti

In voicing their objection

to the railroad line, the homeowners contended that trains would
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"threaten their safety."

If there were a derailment, an accident

or breakdown, we would be completely stranded, 11 says Bill Kirk,
president of the homeowner's association. But apparently the
homeowners expressed concerns did not alter anything, as OUC
proceeded with the ra i 1road route as planned.

Kirk admits he

knew the railroad track had been approved for construction near
the subdivision in which he lives, but says he had no idea how
the tracks would be laid.

11

I thought we would have time to have

some input on where the tracks were laid, but they're working so
fast that they'll have it done before we can telephone the right
office," Kirk states (The Orlando Sentinel, February 24, 1984, p. B-7).
Also expressing concern about the effects of the OUC new
plant on the environment was the Orange County Chapter of the
Florida Audubon Society.

In a letter dated July 15, 1982, the

organization explained that it could not endorse the construction
of the Stanton Energy Center without reservation, but it would
not take an

11

active stand against it since, the process of

approval and permitting through the Public Service Commission
and administrative hearings is nearly complete (M.H. Keim,
personal communication, July 15, 1982).
Additionally,

11

0range County Audubon Society is convinced

that the first priority of any new power plant should be to
reduce the use of oil.

In this respect only do we support this

new coal-fired power plant" (M.H. Keim, personal communication,
July 15, 1982).

In what might be considered an apt summary of

the arguments underscoring the perceived environmental threats
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of the Stanton Energy Center, University of Florida economist
Capehart stated that

11

The need for-the coal-fired power plant

is very small compared to the environmental damage (Abrahams, The
Orlando Sentinel, December 2, 1982, p. C-1).

Table 5 outlines

potential sources of pollution resulting from the OUC coal-fired
plant.
Conservation--The Alternative to the Stanton Energy Center
While environmentalists paint this rather grim picture of
what the Stanton plant would mean for Central Florida's aquatic
and wildlife ecosystems, other critics of the plant concerned
themselves with a related and equally important question-co·ns e rv at i on .

The economically far-reaching oil embargoes of the 1970s
prompted state officials to pass legislation--the 1980 Florida
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act--designed to make Florida*s
57 electric utilities less dependent on oil as a source of fuel.

To this end, consumers statewide have been encouraged to reduce
their

cons~mption

of energy.

But critics contend that, in encouraging utilities to switch
from oil to coal-fired power plants, the state has undermined its
conservation goals.

Nine coal-fired plants, including the Stanton

Energy Cente·r, have been approved s i nee the beg.inning of the 1980s.
Once they go bu i 1d, build, burn, burn, they can , t go conservation, 11
Sierra Club spokesman Pug,h states.
exclusive.

"The goals are mutually

They're (OUC) going to need to pay off that plant
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TABLE 5
MAJOR SOURCES OF POLLUTION RESULTING FROM THE OUC COAL-FIRED PLANT

AIR POLLUTION
Sulphur Dioxide

57 tons per day

Sulphuric Acid

85 tons per day

Nitrogen Oxide

30 tons per day

Particulates

1.5 tons per day

WATER POLLUTION
Fly Ash

350 tons per day

Bottom Ash

350 tons per day

Scrubber Sludge

350 tons per day

Sewage Water for Cooling

high nitrate

OTHER
Coal Dust from Trains

Source:

Sierra Club Manual

1-2 pounds car p/mile
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through energy sales and they can't do that by asking their
customers to conserve 11 (Pugh, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13,
1983, p. A-6).
Pugh further contends that an aggressive conservation program
by OUC would have been much more economical than building the new
plant.
In support of this view, Orlando resident J. R. Mccaffrey
argues that:

'In focusing on the question of reliable energy, "you've

(The Orlando Sentinel) missed a key point in the economic argument
against building this plant at this time.

That is, undertaking the

huge cost of building the plant before we've obtained the maximum
benefits possible from conservation will work strongly against an
effective conservation program 11 (McCaffrey, The Orlando Sentinel,
November 29, 1982, p. 9).
Similarly, Citizens for Conservation has charged that the 11 0UC
has failed to fully consider energy-conservation programs as an
alternative to th 415 megawatt plant" (Gworek, personal communication,
March 1, 1985).

And the Audubon Society states that it is "convinced

that the best method of reducing oil consumption is through the conservation of energy.

While we acknowledge that OUC has established

a program of conservation, we urge you to pursue this program even
more aggressively" (Keim, personal communication, July 15, 1982).
To support this

pro-cons~rvationargument,

Pugh points to the

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) as an ideal example of how
conservation programs can be.

Instead of constructing a
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proposed 640-megawatt coal-fired plant, FPC has resorted to
conservation which has saved the company and its customers
millions of dollars, Pugh states.
An FPC spokesman has disclosed that one of the company's
conservation programs--load management--has saved FPC more than
$64 million in generating costs.

Load management aimed at

controlling some of the biggest energy consumers, such as air
conditioners,

~lectric

heaters, pool pumps and water heaters.

Radio technology is used to turn off these electrical appliances
during times of peak energy use.

As compensation for signing up

for the load management program, customers get credit ranging from
$14 to $18 on their uti-lity bills (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando
Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6).
Why, then did OUC not emulate FPC by promoting 11 aggressive 11
conservation, but instead opted for building the Stanton Power Center?
According to OUC planner Don Moore, his company did not
consider conservation as an alternative to building the coal-fired
plant because conservation technology was still considered
11

experimental 11 when plans for the plant were made in 1978.

"Now

OUC is too far along in building the coal plant to 'launch an
active program• of conservation," Moore states (Nesbitt, Simmons,
The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6).
OUC's conservation efforts have been limited to energy audits,
customer-awareness programs, and giving each customer a $10 credit
for buying energy-efficient appliances (Nesbitt, Simmons, The
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Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6).
But OUC critics argue that installing a load-management
program similar to FPC's could delay the need for the Stanton
plant until the early 2000s.

Capehart, who has written numerous

reports on energy management for state and federal officials,
contends that OUC could use a load-management program to meet its
energy needs until the 1990s at a cost almost $100 million less
than construction of additional generating capacity.
Citing studies performed for the Governor's Energy Office and
for the PSC, the Sierra Club claims that savings of 50 percent on
residential consumption are achievable using existing products,
appliances and technology.

"OUC could embark on an aggressive

plan to encourage all of their customers to switch to highefficiency appliances and devices when their old ones wear out, 11
states Jack Blackburn (Blackburn, personal communication, January
15, 1985).

According to Blackburn, appliances such as gas water heaters,
high-efficiency refrigerators, and high-efficiency air conditioners
could save from 30 to 100 percent on energy use.

These potential

savings for the residential sector have been outlined in Table 6.
The Rekindling of the Legal Struggle
Up untn early 1984., none of the indiv.i duals, community groups,
or organizations opposing the Stanton Energy Center has scored a
single victory over the OUC.

Not even the pro-conservationists

with their attractive energy-saving proposal could dissuade the
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TABLE 6
POTENTIAL SAVINGS ON ELECTRICITY BY USING ENERGY-EFFICIENT
APPLIANCES AND DEVICES IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR

Gas-Water Heaters
Saves 100 percent of electric use

248.3 GWH

Gas Space Heaters
Saves 100

~ercent

of electric use

106.7 GWH

High-Efficiency Refrigerators
80.8 GWH

Saves over 50 percent of electric use
High-Efficienty Air Conditioners

42.6 GWH

Saves about 30 percent of electric use

478.4 GWH
At a 60 percent load factor and a 20 percent reserve margin, this
is equal to 109 MW of capacity.
Other Amounts of Savings Can be Obtained by Using:
Heat-Pump Space Heaters

60.3 GWH

Heat-Pump Water Heaters

124.2 GWH

Solar Water Heaters

173.8 GWH

Heat Recovery Water Heaters

124.2 GWH

Source:

Sierra Club's proposed conservation plan
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utility from building its multi-million dollar power plant.

In

May 1984, however, an event which still did not alter construction
plans, at least sent OUC running to the public, via the media, to
solicit support for the plant.
Seven months after P.O.W.E.R. Now appealed its case on the
referendum, the 5th District Court of Appeal ruled that Orlando
must let city residents vote on the city's participation in the
project.

The court
stressed, however, that because of OUC's
r

autonomy, the city and residents could not stop the utility from
building the power plant (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24,
1984, p. B-1).
Having scored their first victory in the appeal court,
opponents of the Stanton Energy Center returned to the Orange
County Circuit Court, this time to ask for a temporary injunction
halting construction on the plant pending the referendum.
request was not granted.

But the

The Orlando City Council scheduled the

referendum for September 4, 1984 after P.O.W.E.R. Now protested
the council's initial decision to hold the vote in November.
As the referendum approached, opponents and supporters of the
power plant stepped up their efforts to lure voters into their
respective camps.
The OUC advertising campaign, according. to The Orlando Sentinel,
cost a total of $175,000.

The utility began telling its story

with an in-house media program about a year prior to the
referendum.

Fliers promoting the coal-fired plant were also
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distributed.

However, it was not until the week of August 6,

1984--approximately three weeks before the referendum--that OUC
invested most of its energies and money in its media campaign.
Prompting opponents to characterize the referendum as a "fight
bet"ween David and Goliath," the OUC poured $33,000 into its
advertising program (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 6,
1984, p. A-1).

According to Pugh, the utility ran 10 television

advertisements a day prior to the vote on the plant (Hurvitz,
Public Relations Business, August 5, 1984, p. 4).
In addition to utilizing television to promote the plant,
OUC also advertised heavily on radio and in newspapers, and
distributed booklets and brochures.

Distribution of the pro-

Stanton literature began at the OUC Orange Avenue headquarters,
when utility officials arranged to have a booklet discussing the
need of the plant stuffed into employees' pay envelopes (Simmons,
The Orlando Sentinel, August 6, 1984, p. C-1), also confirmed in
interview with OUC officials).
An announcement on August 29, 1984, that the cost of the
new plant would be $511 million, $19 million less than
the previous estimate made in November, 1983.
Tours of the construction site were conducted two
weeks before the referendum.
OUC Today, a twice-yearly tabloid with feature stories
highlighting OUC activities was sent to customers
(personal communication with OUC officials and
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supporters--Smith, Ferran--also reported in
Public Relations Business, 1984, p. 4).
"We're going to do everything to make sure everybody knows
why we proposed the project, and why we have gone ahead with it,"
OUC spokesman Steve Willis states.

The primary targets of the

media campaign, according to OUC advertising consultants, were the
undecided voters, estimated by these consultants to be over 40
percent of the ,..city's eligible voters (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel,
August 6, 1984, p. C-1).
Funds for the advertising campaign were disbursed after OUC
officials voted to divert money intended for promotion of
conservation to publicity, aimed at halting what had been perceived
as "an erosion of public support for the plant" (personal communication with OUC officials, also reported in The Orlando Sentinel,
August 6, 1984, p. C-6).
The $175,000 spent on promoting the power plant contrasted
sharply with the ouc•s 1982 advertising budget of $5,000 (Ibid).
Perhaps the greatest boost for the OUC position came from
the aggressive publicity campaign undertaken by Energy for
Tomorrow, a group of business _people, formed with the expressed
purpose of "fighting for tbe coal-fired plant.

11

Group chairman

Harry Ferran, president of the Orlando-based Ferran Engineering
Group, contends that opponents of the Stanton Energy Center
relied on "half-truths" in their attempt to incite public
disapproval of the project (Ferran, personal communication,
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January 11, 1985).
Energy for Tomorrow, Ferran explains, had one purpose, and
that was "to see to it that the people of Orlando voted No,"
therefore supporting their own utility.

Besides, the case against

the plant was so weak, that it was fallacious and we had to do
something to set the record straight" (Ferran, personal communication,
January 11, 1985).
Questioned on his business dealings with OUC, Ferran says
hi s three e 1ectr i ca 1 and pl _um bi ng comp an i es had , i n the pas t ,
done "some work" for the utility but he emphasized that that had
nothing to do with his involvement in the pro-OUC campaign.
According to a contract report from OUC consulting firm,
none of Ferran's companies had a contract with the utility at the
time the research for this study was being conducted.

However,

several of the members of the 29-member Energy for Tomorrow
steering committee represented firms that do business--some
regularly--with OUC.
consulting firm,

Included with OUC's public relations

Fry-H~mmond-Bar.r, -

Inc., and the Barnett

banking system, which loaned the utility $25 million to help
finance the power plant (Energy for Tomorrow "Contribution Report,"
1984, also Black and Veatch Engineering firm, "Contract Report").
In a seven-week period, Ferran's group which disbanded after
the referendum, raised over $100,000 from businesses supporting
the Stanton plant.

Of this amount, 47 percent came from out of

state companies, the group's contribution reports showed (Energy
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for Tomorrow Contribution Report, August 1984, pp. 1-5).
Among the out of state contributors were companies which
also regularly do business with OUC.

Included are the utilities

consulting engineering firm, Black and Veatch, which contributed
$4,250 OUC financial consultants, M. G. Lewis and Co., gave $1,000,
and Lewis' president James Lentz contributed $500.

Other

contributors were Orlando Mayor Bill Frederick who gave $100,
Merrill Lynch of New York, a broker for OUC bonds gave $1,000,
~

and Westinghouse Electric Corporation of Orlando, who was hired
to build the $27 million turbine generator for the new plant,
contributed $1,000 (Energy for Tomorrow contribution report,
August 1984, pp. 1-5).
Of the $100,000 raised, $93,000 was paid to supporters for
staffing a phone bank and for mailing campaign materials and
bumper stickers to Orlando residents, Ferran explains.

In addition

to phoning voters, distributing stickers and mailing brochures,
Energy for Tomorrow, aided by its Orlando-based public relations
agency, Public Relations Unlimited, Inc., also engaged in highvolume advertising in local media, scheduled press conferences and
speaking engagements with social and civic organizations, and
wrote letters to local newspapers (Ferran, personal communication,
January 11, 1985).
Table 7 is a breakdown of Energy for Tomorrow's publicity campaign.
Much of the publicity effort by both the OUC and Energy for
Tomorrow addressed the charges leveled against the power plant by
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critics--the need for the plant, the effects on the environment,
future increases in electricity rates and conservation.

One of the

group's advertisements, perhaps the most detailed and convincing,
with the endorsement of Orlando Mayor Bill Frederick, best illustrates the thrust of the pro-Stanton campaign.
If the referendum passes, and the Orlando Utilities
Commission stops construction of the new plant . . . we
will alL-lose.
Already, over $120 million have been spent, and that
money didn't come from

11

Uncle Sam. 11

from investors, who must be repaid.

It was borrowed
Repaid to the very

last cent, even if there is no new plant to help meet these
long-term financial obligations.
If the referendum is passed, the potential effect on our
electric bills and our tax bills is not only obvious,
but unavoidable.

Every single citizen in the City of

Orlando will lose if we don't finish contruction of the
new coal-fired electrical plant (Energy for Tomorrow,
paid political advertisement, The Orlando Sentinel,
August 28, 1984, p. 3).
While OUC and its supporters conducted their massive media
campaign, extolling the virtues of the Stanton plant, opponents
repeated charges that the power plant is not needed.

But regardless

of how credible opponents views had been, their inability to match
the spending power of the OUC and its allies minimized the impact
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Table 7
Energy for Tomorrow's Publicity Campaign

* Three press conferences: one at OUC's

62 year old

plant to announce the formation of Energy for
Tomorrow; one at the construction site to dramatize
that

$110

million

had

already been spent on the plant,

and one in the office of the supervisor of elections
to

*

cla~ify

M~dia

the inverted language of the referendum.

interviews, including a prime-time debate on

WCPX-Channel 6 television.

* Four direct mail pieces--every Orlando resident got
at least one.

* Distribution of door hangers in the minority community,
listing minority leaders who supported the plant.

* Endorsements_, inc 1ud i ng one from the Chamber of
Commerce and one from Mayor Bill Frederick, quoted
previously.

* Speeches to community groups.
* A phone bank, in whi'ch every registered voter was
called four different times with four different
messages.
Source:

The September 24 edition of Public Relations Business,
a weekly news service of public relations.
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they might have otherwise had on the public.

In fact, in the

early stages of the pre-referendum campaign, P.O.W.E.R. Now
explained that it was concerned that opposing views would get
buried under the "media blitz 11 planned by OUC and Energy for
Tomorrow (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 6, 1984, p. C-1).
"I think people need to hear both sides to make an honest
judgment, but we don't have the money to match them dollar for
advertising do}lar, 11 says P.O.W.E.R. Now spokesman Roger Gaines.
Besides, Gaines states that he and fellow opponents of the plant
were angry at OUC for using "ratepayers money to fight ratepayers"
instead of implementing conservation programs (Simmons, The
Orlando Sentinel, August 16, 1984, p. A-1).
Despite their poor financial status, however, critics of the
Stanton power facility continued their fight to stop construction
of the plant.

With a little over $5,000 in contributions and dues

from members and supporters, P.O.W.E.R. Now embarked on a city-wide
volunteer phone drive, asking residents to vote against the new
OUC plant.

In addition, the organization prepared a · four-page

tabloid and, with assistance from the Sierra Club members, mounted
a door-to-door campaign throughout Orlando's 44 voting precincts
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985).
According to P.O.W.E.R. Now president Cornell, her organization
wanted "to put a paper on the doorstep of each of Orlando's 60,000
registered voters.

In addition to door-to-door canvassing, P.O.W.E.R.

Now in collaboration with the Sierra Club and Citizens for
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Conservation--a new group also opposing the Stanton plant--planned
a media campaign, which urged voters to side with the OUC critics.
Like the other publicity efforts, however, this last-ditch attempt
by opponents to gain public support was hampered by limited funds
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985).
Citizens for Conservation was organized approximately three
weeks before the referendum at the promptings of Sierra Club
spokesman Irby r Pugh.

Like the Sierra Club, which raised about

$2,000 in contributions from sympathizers, Citizens for
Conservation received no corporate support toward its campaign
against the OUC power plant.

Instead, the 12-member organization

depended heavily on press coverage and on the free time donated
by area media to get its message out (Gworek, personal communication,
March 1, 1985).
Elaborating on this point, Walt Gworek, Chairman of the
Citizens for Conservation, states that the advertisements backing
the referendum were possible only because of federal law, which
requires that broadcasters provide equal time for opposing views on
controversial views.

Three local television stations and three radio

stations donated time for plant opponents' views after Gworek
requested equal time to rebut OUC's advertisements.

WFTV-Channel

9, WOFL-Channel 35, WJYO-FM, WDBO-AM-FM and K-92-FM donated the
air time accounting for nearly all of the $14,000 worth of help
Citizens for Conservation received (Gworek, personal communication,
March 1, 1985).
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Like the opponents of the Stanton plant, Gworek and his
colleagues rallied support around the issues of the need, environmental impact and economics of the new coal-fired plant.

Besides,

Gworek states that his group was concerned with the way the OUC
and the city of Orlando went about acquiring the site for the
Stanton Energy Center.

Plant opponents claim that the property

on which the plant is being built was improperly acquired.
However,

criti~s

have not substantiated this charge.

The city

used its condemnation power to get the property for the plant and
a railroad spur.

11

Why did OUC mount such a massive campaign if the

vote didn't matter?" Gworek asks.

"There are a lot of different

pieces that did not seem to fit together," (Gworek, personal
communication, March 1, 1985).
Apparently, the speculations and confusion expressed by
Gworek reflected at least some broader feeling of the Orlando
community, as charges and countercharges surfaced concerning the
proposed plant.

Turnout at the polls on September 4 was roughly

similar to turnout in other referendum elections.

Of the 60,000

registered voters, only 21,395--roughly 37 percent--cast ballots.
Sixty-five percent of the voters favored the referendum (City
Clerk's election records).

In 1978, a referendum on single

member district attracted only 40 percent of .the city's registered
voters to the polls.

Again, in 1971 when voters were asked

whether the city of Orlando should acquire property at Turkey Lake
for a public recreational center, only about 32 percent cast
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ballots (G. Chewning, personal communication, March 7, 1985).
Commenting on the 65 percent voter support for the plant OUC
board chairman claims, "The results really show a vote of confidence
in the OUC, and the way the utility is being run" (Simmons, The
0r1 and o Senti ne 1 , September 5 , 19 84 , p. A-1 ) .

"Si mi1 ar 1y , Energy

for Tomorrow spokesman Harry Ferran states that "I'm very pleased.
Now we can move ahead and get this power p1ant built on schedule"
(The Orlando Septinel, September 5, 1984, p. A-1).
For plant opponents, the results spelt 11 disappointment, 11
though they admitted that they were not surprised by the outcome.
We never had a chance against the $300,000 that OUC and Energy for
Tomorrow spent on the campaign, 11 Gaines says as he conceded defeat.
Besides, ciritics contend that "The city purposely acted to make
the vote meaningless."

According to Ramsdell, the vote might have

been influenced by the $120 million spent on the plant before the
referendum (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 5, 1984, p.
B-1).

Ramsdell claims that most of that money was spent since

May 1983, when P.O.W.E.R. Now presented city officials with a
petition signed by 12,000 Orlando voters calling for a referendum.
The referendum asked residents if they supported or opposed
the city of Orlando's participation in the power plant project.
Critics argue that the wording of the
clarity.

refere~dum

The actual wording is as follows:

question lacked

86
Shall the Charter and Code of the City of Orlando be
changed by the addition of sections to prohibit the
City from constructing or assisting in any way in the
construction of any coal-fired electrical plant in
Orange County? (Energy for Tomorrow, August 1984).
Because of the wording of this question, a 11 No 11 vote
indicated support for the plant, a "Yes" vote meant opposition.
,.

E_conomi c Stake

Although the legal and political struggle culminating in the
city-wide referendum revolved primarily around environmental and
economic considerations, there was another important factor which
added fuel to the fight against the OUC power plant.

An observation

by William A. Gamson best illustrates this latter dimension of the
opposition.
Rancorous conflicts, Gamson contends, often stem from the
belief by an opposition that "norms about the waging of political
conflict • . . have been violated."

Consequently, "actions occur

which produce a shared belief that tactics used to influence the
outcome are 'dirty,' 'underhanded,' 'vicious'" (Gamson, 1966, p. 71).
Critics of the Stanton plant have repeatedly charged that some
of the individuals and agencies responsible for approving the
project were not disinterested parties and therefore could not
have acted in the public's interest.

The OUC decision makers,

these opponents argue, bypassed an economically-viable
conservation plan and recommended that a new facility be built

87

because they will gain from the plant's construction.

"This is a

prime example of economic interest winning over public interest,"
Pugh says of the OUC's decision (Pugh, personal communication,
October 12, 1984).
According to the Sierra Club and other opponents, OUC's
consulting engineers recommended the building of the facility
despite clear indications that it may not be needed.

"It's not

rational to depend on Black and Veatch to study the need for the
plant when they will profit so much from its construction," Pugh
argues.

The Sierra Club contends that Black and Veatch will make

$20 million on the coal-fired plant (Pugh, personal communication,
October 12, 1984).
The OUC consultants will not be the only business to gain from
the Stanton Energy center.

"We hate to see it not built, because

it will give a real boost to the local economy," states Richard
Coleman of the association of Builders and Contractors in Winter
Park.

Coleman explained that contractors were expected to get

about $300 million worth of contracts and another $200 million
would go to out of state business.

Yet, the association itself

was not a contributor to the OUC media campaign, but individual
members of the association did contribute to the pro-plant
campaign.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation.'s steam generator

division in Orlando will gain from the building of the power
plant.

Westinghouse has more than $29.1 million in contracts to

build a turbine generator and other parts for the plant.
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Westinghouse donated $1,000 to the pro-plant campaign (Nesbitt,
Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, pp. A-1, A-4).
Gregory Presnell, an Orlando attorney for Westinghouse, confirmed
that Westinghouse's action stemmed from fear of losing the contract
with the utility if the court-ordered referendum had favored critics
of the plant.

"They've (Westinghouse) got a valid and binding

contract with OUC and in that this litigation could damage and
impair the futyre of the plant; it could damage Westinghouse,"
Presnell says (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 3, 1983,
p. A-1).
According to an OUC document dated August 16, 1983, the
Westinghouse contract was one of 34 the utility awarded for a total
contract value of $155 million before Graham and the Cabinet
approved the plant in 1982 (OUC contract report, August 16, 1983).
Financial companies, too, have a stake in the power facility
being built.

OUC financial advisers confirmed that the investment

bankers chosen "to put together" and market the utility's bonds
will share approximately $6.5 million as reward for their involvement
in bond-selling (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 15,
1983, pp. A-1, A-6).

Of this amount, about $800,000 went to bankers

who put the bond issue together, promoted it, and recruited others
for the venture.

Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers,

E. F. Hutton, and Leedy Wheeler and Alleman, an Orlando broker, were
the coordinators of the bond sale.
to the OUC media campaign.

Most of these companies contributed

E. F. Hutton and Merrill Lynch, for
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example, each donated $1,00 (Energy for Tomorrow's contribution
report, The Orlando Sentinel, December 6, 1982, p. B-1).
The bond-selling venture also induced former OUC board member
· Richard Weiner to resign his post with the utility in July 1983,
so he could bid on the bonds, critics allege.

Weiner says he

resigned because his work did not allow him enough time for the
11

pressing needs of the OUC. 11

Lindblom,

Wein~

But according to OUC member Grace

was urged by his employer, Shearson-American

Express Inc., to resign so it could bid for some of the utility's
bond business.

"The firm has not been able to participate to the

extent it would like in underwriting some of OUC's bonds because
Dick (Weiner) is on the board, 11 Lindbloom states (Simmons, The
Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-1).
In addition, organized labor and other workers also could
make as much as $66.9 million from the Stanton Energy Center, a
Sentinel report states.

Expanding on this observation, the

report explains that labor leaders have won an argument from OUC
that required union and non-union contractors to pay wages that
are slightly higher than current wage scales (Ibid).

The

agreement called for a minimum hourly wage of $9.62 for unskilled
laborers employed on the Stanton power plant.
construction workers will get 5 percent raises.

After two years of
OUC electric

manager Lou Stone said the agreement increased the cost of the
plant by about $1 million, but provided protection against strikes
(The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6).
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Apart from the consulting engineers, the investment bankers,
and the unions, the Orange County government has been singled out
as another body supporting the plant, in the hopes of benefitting
from its construction.

According to the Sierra Club, the county

commission plans to give treatment sewage to OUC, and has already
benefitted from the utility's decision to help pay for building a
road for a developer near the plant.
position on the ,.power plant

11

The county commission's

is becoming a political issue, 11

Pugh charges (Scherberger, The Orlando Sentinel, August 20, 1982,
p. B-1).

Thus, while the Stanton Energy Center may help customers to
lower their future electricity bills, it also helps the consultants,
contractors, financiers, laborers and county government who benefit
directly from its construction.
The Opposition's Strategy
Opposition to the Stanton Energy Center developed somewhat
haphazardly.

In fact, some of the OUC critics argue that little or

no attempt had been made by their own various opposition groups to
establish any form of network in presenting their case against OUC.
According to Cornell, inter-group rivalry, difficulty in
recruiting committed members, and inadequate media coverage were the
primary factors which mitigated against the oppostion movement.
Each organization, including P.O.W.E.R. Now, operated almost
autonomously throughout the pre-referendum campaign Cornell states
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985).
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Cornell states that she was amazed at how "politics can get in
the way of public interest. 11

She explains that P.O.W.E.R. Now's hopes

for a unified struggle against OUC were shattered when members of
the Young Republicans started expressing dissatisfaction with the way
certain organizational activities had been proceeding.

According to

Cornell, the Young Republicans' offer to join forces with P.O.W.E.R.
Now for the suit against the city of Orlando was indeed a welcome
gesture.

No sooner, however, had both organizations started

working together, the Young Republicans began to complain that they
"weren't getting enough publicity."

Complaints of this nature, she

says, were often accompanied by absenteeism and genera 1 uncooperati veness
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985).
Eventually, the Young Republicans dissociated themselves from
P. 0. W. E. R. Now.
The collaboration between P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Sierra Club
became slacked off as time progressed.

When P.O.W.E.R. Now

organized in April 1982, it was Sierra Club attorney and spokesman
Irby Pugh who gave the main address at the initial organizational
meeting.

At that particular meeti.ng, Pugh tried to convince people

that the power plant would create more harm than good, and he
implored those present to join the fight against the project
(Abrahams, The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 1982·, pp. 8-1, B-7).
At the same organizational meeting, P.O.W.E.R. Now's founder
distributed handbills quoting club member Barney Capehart as saying
"power bills would rise $150 a month after the Stanton Energy Center
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began operation" (Abrahams, The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 1982,
p. B-1).

Essentially, Capehart and Pugh's messages became the

message of P.O.W.E.R. Now.
However, as Pugh himself acknowleged in a statement quoted
earlier in this chapter, the Sierra Club became dissillusioned
after losing the court case against OUC, asking for a new
certification hearing on the power plant.

Consequently, enthusiasm

dissipated and the organization's involvement in joint anti-Stanton
~

activities decreased considerably.

According to Cornell, the

Sierra Club did help in distributing fliers prior to the referendum,
but that was the extent of the cooperation between the two groups
after Pugh's loss in court (Cornell, personal communication, March
3, 1985).

On the whole, each organization operated autonomously, but
there were clear signs of informal networking among them.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of this phenomenon was the
extent to which group membership overlapped.

For example, many

of P.O.W.E.R. Now's members were also members of the· Sierra Club
and vice versa.

Some more specific examples will better illustrate

the nature of this overlapping of organizational membership.

Bill

Kirk, president of the Isle of Pines Homeowners Association, was
also an active Sierra Club member, Belle Isle City councilman, Mo
Rigante and Maitland Mayor Blaschka, whose cities protested the
OUC coal route through their neighborhoods, were also members of
Citizens for Conservation (Gworek, personal communication, March
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1, 1985, The Orlando Sentinel, August 9, 1984, p. B-1).
In addition to group overlapping, the periodic emergence of
new protest organizations throughout the pre-referendum campaign
also indicates that there was at least some loose collaboration
among the various groups.

"We were very much in touch with the

people of P.O.W.E.R. Now," Gworek states.

He explains as well that

both the Sierra Club and P.O.W.E.R. Now suggested the formation of
Citizens for Canservation as a means of exerting additional pressure
on OUC and attract more publicity.

11

The reason we formed was

basically to be another group that was opposed to the plant, and
to get as much publicity as possible," Gworek says (personal
communication, March 1, 1985).
Additionally, Gworek states that Citizens for Conservation was
perceived as a "counter group" for Energy for Tommorrow, confirming
the belief that the birth of the opposition group on the heels
of a pro-OUC organization was by no means a coincidence, but
rather another carefully-calculated effort by the opposition to
stop construction of the Stanton Energy Center.
There was only one organization which admittedly modified its
strategy opposing the power plant.

Unlike P.O.W.E.R. Now, which

organized for the sole purpose of "stopping the coal plant,

11

the

Sierra Club initially wanted only to ensure that if the plant
were built, it would be "as clean as possible."

But more and

more we became convinced that the plant would be an economic
burden for OUC customers, so we began opposing it on this ground
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as well, 11 Pugh states (Pugh, personal communication, October 12,
1984).
As club members and other experts continued uncovering facts
supporting the environmental and economic arguments raised against
the · power center, the Sierra Club finally switched to opposing
the actual construction of the plant (Pugh, personal communication,
October 12, 1984).
The Role of the Media
The absence of persistent, formal networking among the
various opposition groups was but one of the many problems
undermining the organizations' impact in the struggle over the
proposed plant.

Equally formidable was what plant critics,

including Cornell and Pugh, describe as the "lack of cooperation
from the media. 11
"We had absolutely no cooperation from the media . . . in my
opinion,

11

3, 1985).

Cornell states (Cornell, personal communication, March
Expressing the same view, Pugh claims that valuable

information supporting his organization's charges against the
OUC "never got past the editors

11

(Pugh, personal communication,

October 12, 1984).
Elaborating on the charges that the media played no role in
enhancing the opposition's case against ouc, .cornell contends that
the "little" time most of the local media allotted for coverage
opposing views came under the provision of the "fairness doctrine,"
discussed earlier in this chapter.

The Orlando Sentinel, for
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example, refused to give any form of support to OUC critics,
Cornell charges.

Channel 9, Cornell says, gave some coverage to

OUC critics during the ea r ly stages of the struggle, but this
ended when the opposition started unearthing information
supporting some of the allegations leveled against the utility's
new power plant (Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985).
According to Cornell, a Channel 9 reporter lost his job with
the station when he attempted to break a story on the "hidden truth"
surrounding ownership and acquisition of the property on which
the coal-fired plant is being constructed.

Other media, including

Channel 6, received leads on the same story from OUC critics, but
refused also to investigate the matter, Cornell states (personal
communication, March 3, 1985).
But both television stations denied parts of these
allegations.
Channel 9 news editor Ron Comings admits that Jan Fisher, a
former reporter assigned to cover the coal-plant controversy,· was
relieved of that responsibility and eventually fired .not because
he attempted to break any story relating to the OUC plant, but
because "Jan wasn't doing his job" (Comings, personal communication,
Ma re h 7 , 1985) .
According to Comings, Fisher, who was "drawn into the camp
of the opposition," did attempt to broadcast a story on the
alleged irregularities characterizing the methods employed by
both the city of Orlando and the OUC to acquire the property for
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the plant, but "the story was killed because Jan had not
thoroughly investigated it."

There was no evidence to support

the charges, Comings says (personal communication, March 7, 1985).
In response to the charge that the media, including Channel
9, downplayed the opposition's case, Comings states that:
We gave adequate exposure to opponents of the plant,
but that group of people always assumed that we were
supporting the OUC . . . that OUC had us in their back
pockets.

They refused to believe that we were

attacking the issue as aggressively as possible
(Comings, personal communication, March 7, 1985).
Comings further explains that Channel 9, in an editorial,
did come out in support of the power plant eventually, because
"we were satisfied that the plant was needed.

OUC executives

were able to convince us that economically, the coal plant would
help the community."

In addition, Comings says the management of

Channel 9 was also satisfied with the explanation OUC furnished
for having selected the east Orange county location

~or

the plant.

According to Comings, OUC claimed that economic and environmental
considerations were among the factors influencing the site
selection (Comings, personal communication, March 7, 1985).
Like Channel 9, Channel 6 contends that it gave fair and
ample coverage to the arguments of both OUC and its critics.

Ed

Bates, executive producer of Channel 6 states that throughout the
debate generated by the new plant, his station "remained neutral.
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We took no position either way; we were just giving information
to the public.

As a news department, we don't take issues, we

just report issues" (Bates, personal cof1111unication, March 7, 1985).
In addition to regular coverage of activities on the plant
controversy, Channel 6 aired an hour-long call-in program for
the public to express its views on the project, Bates explains.
Basically, this program aimed at "clarifying a lot of the talk that
had been going ... on about the plant for the voters" (Bates, personal
communication, March 7, 1985).
He also claims that at no time had Channel 6 failed to keep the
public informed of any developments involving the power plant.
According to Bates, a reporter, who no longer works with the
station, had mentioned on several occasions that she had 11 a great
story" but said she was "afraid" to break it.

The reporter,

apparently alluding to the alleged irregularities surrounding the
property acquired for the Stanton plant, left "without giving us
the vaguest idea of what she had been talking about" (Bates,
personal communication, March 7, 1985).
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Sierra Club advocates argue that, like the
electronic media, local newspapers gave only limited and biased
coverage to opposing views.

The Orlando Sentinel, the only major

daily newspaper in the community, has been singled out by plant
critics as the chief offender.
However, careful examination of the plant-related stories
carried by The Orlando Sentinel between 1978 and 1983 not only
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suggest that the issue in question had been extensively investigated,
but also reported without apparent newsworthy bias.

Generally, the

newspaper's stories informed readers of the developments of the
issue--OUC's proposals, the oppositions's challenges, and the
outcome of subsequent lawsuits.

Of the 110 power-plant stories

examined by the author of this study, 74--about 70 percent-carried headlines reflecting the activities of opponents.
The remainjng stories largely highlighted the 11 actionreaction11 character of the debate between OUC and its critics.
Here are some examples of the plant-related story headlines:
11

Critics:

Stanton Plant will Discourage Conservation,"

"Coal-Fired

Plant Won't Save as Much as Forecast, Report Says, 11 and "Conservationists Join Opposition to Coal-Fired Plant. 11
Among the stories reviewed, there is one--an in-depth article
titled "Oil vs Coal:

An Argument that may Backfire on OUC"-- in

which The Sentinel speculates on the future of the new power plant.
"The Sentinel , 11 the story reads, 11 has spent more than three months
looking at the economic and political pros and cons of the Stanton
plant.

The project . • . uncovered a number of problems that could

turn the plant into a white elephant."

The problems here alluded to

were those repeatedly raised by the opposition--higher utility bills,
excess supply of energy, and the OUC promoting consumption instead
of conservation (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November
13, 1983, pp. A-1, A-14).
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A content analysis of The Sentinel editorials over the same
period in question reveal a great deal of fluctuation in the
paper's position on the Stanton power plant.

However, only about

20 percent of the editorials on the plant support OUC critics.
For example, in a September 1983 editorial titled "OUC Foes
Deserve Day in Court," The Sentinel notes that OUC officials had been
considering asking an appeal court to require the Sierra Club,
P.O.W.E.R. Now ...and the Central Florida Young Republicans to buy
11

expensive 11 bonds to defray the cost of further delays on the plant,

resulting from lawsuits filed by critics.
But according to The Sentinel,
OUC's concern about the cost of delays is well founded.
After all, utility officials contend that the delays
are costing perhaps as much as $3.7 million a month,
although the opponents say the costs are nowhere near
that, if any at all.

Regardless of who is right on

that one, there's a larger issue here.

It is the same

issue of how we settle difference of opinions and how
citizens oppose decisions made by those in authority.
Ultimately, it involves whether citizens can "fight
City Hall."

It is part of what keeps America talking

across tables instead of shouting across streets.
Short-circuiting the legal process by making it too
expensive for the opponents is unacceptable.
process may be tiring.

The

It may even be subject to
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exploitation for personal gain, and it is clearly
expensive, but it is a system that works (Dunn, The
Orlando Sentinel, September 13, 1983, p. A-18).
In like manner, The Orlando Sentinel ran editorials which
may be considered supportive of the OUC--these accounted for about
55 percent of those plant-related editorials reviewed by the author.
Having learned of plant critics' intention of launching the
referendum campaign, The Orlando Sentinel responded with an
r

editorial which questioned not only the wisdom of the opposition's
action, but also the "zealousness among some of the petition pushers."
According to the editorial:
We are as dedicated to the principle of democracy
as anyone, but government by referendum has its
limits.

An obvious one is in deciding such complex

matters as when a new generating plant is to be built
and what fuel it should use (Haile, The Orlando Sentinel,
February 11, 1983, p. A-18).
Also, in the period immediately before the referendum, The
Sentinel ran several pro-OUC editorials with titles such as:
11

0UC Plant is a Look Ahead, 11 "Give OUC Go-Ahead on Plant," and

11

Get on With the OUC Plant. 11
Perhaps the most profound, explicit and far-reaching of

the editorials was that published on August 22, 1984, a little
more than a week before the city-wide referendum.

After a brief
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historical account of the development of the Stanton Energy Center,
the editor proceeded to ask:
What should voters do?

They ought to support the

Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center because getting on
with the plant is in the best interest of the
community
be built?

...

Legalities aside, should the plant

Yes, not only because OUC already has

sunk a hefty $120 million into it but also because
the Orlando area would be better off with the plant
(The Orlando Sentinel, August 22, 1984, p. A-14).
Again on September 3, 1984--the day before the referendum-an editorial, titled

11

0UC Plant is a Look Ahead, 11 stated that:

The question of the OUC plant is not something we
have taken lightly.

For the past three years, we

have talked continually with people on all sides of
the issue.

We have talked with the experts as well

as with armchair observers.

More than once we have

debated the issue among ourselves.

We believe that

OUC is right; the plant should be built . . . looking
to the future is what the new coal-fired power plant
in east Orange County is all about.
say "no."

Voters should

Let the plant continue with ·no more

hitches (Healy, The Orlando Sentinel, September
3, 1984, p. A-18).
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Similarly, in an editorial two weeks before the referendum,
William H. Turpin of the weekly Orlando Business Journal states
that .

11

0UC provides cheap, reliable service--has the second

lowest electric rate among major Florida cities at $70.55 a month
for 1,000 kilowatt hours."

Turpin then asks:

"Is there an

alternate way of providing power for Central Florida's
dramatic growth, both present and future?

. The citizens of

Orlando should vote
in favor of the plant and the city participation"
r
(Turpin, 1984, p. 6).
Prior to siding with OUC, most of The Orlando Sentinel's
editorials mirrored the same kind of objectivity perceived in its
plant-related news stories.

Not only had the newspaper, on

occasions, warned OUC to "guard against getting locked into a mind
set of 'By golly, we are right and that's it"'

but it also

implored the utility's commissioners to "make sure there is no
spite against those opposing the plant" (Dunn, The Orlando
Sentinel, October 10, 1983, p. A-18).
In addition to warning against self-righteousness· and malice,
The Orlando Sentinel also reprimanded OUC for having demonstrated
ignorance on some crucial matters relating to the new coal-fired
plant.

The paper notes, for example, that when the city of

Lakeland--one of the original partners in the power plant venture-pulled out of the deal, not one of the five commissioners on the OUC
board could say how this action would affect consumer's monthly bills.
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Commenting on the apparent lack of expertise on the subject in
question, The Orlando Sentinel argues that:
No doubt there will be serious questions as to how a
$546 million plant could have gotten this far along
without a solid idea of who's in and who's out.
Were it not for lawsuits by environmentalists
opposed to the proposed plant, OUC would already be
in New

Yor~

trying to sell the bonds needed to build

it (Dunn, The Orlando Sentinel, March 26, 1983, p. A-18).
Although the precise impact of the media on the outcome of the
fight over the Stanton Energy Center cannot be determined from the
data in this work, it was clear, however, that they did play a
crucial role in disseminating information to the public.

Equally

obvious was the fact that much of this information came from OUC
and its allies, whose wealth and human resources enabled them to
utilize the full potentials of the media to defeat plant opponents.
The overwhelming support from local as well as out-of-state firms,
backed by OUC's strong organizational structure formed the very
foundation upon which the OUC built and sustained its effective
media program.
Plant opponents, on the other hand, lacked these essential
i ngredi en ts, and as a resu 1t had only 1i mi te.d access to the media.
Lack of coordination and financial resources in particular were
the factors contributing most to the low-keyed media campaign and
subsequent defeat of OUC critics.

In addition, this author is of
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the opinion that had The Orlando Sentinel and other media
endorsing the power plant given critics the same kind of support
OUC received, especially on the eve of the referendum, OUC
opponents might have fared better in the struggle.

CHAPTER IV
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POWER-PLANT ISSUE
The case of the OUC coal-fired plant discussed in the
preceeding chapters has highlighted, perhaps more than anything
else, the dynamics of power at the community level.
Up until fafrly recently, a disproportionate number of social
scientists, _who explored the concept of power, focused not on
the local community, but rather on the topmost, national level.
But this has changed considerably.

Alluding to this change,

Martin N. Marger (1981) states that:
It is there (the national level) that the most
encompassing and consequential issues are decided
where such decisions affect everyone in the society.
But we are also affected by what happens at lesser
levels of power, particularly within the cities and
towns where we live and work.

Indeed the decisions

of community political and economic elites are closer
and more comprehensible to us than at any other level.
Local economic leaders are better known than
executives of the multi-national corporations, and
local political leaders or their agents are dealt
105
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with more frequently and directly than those of the
federal government.

Thus, although less significant

for the society as a whole, the structures and processes
of power at the community level bear some attention .
. (p. 243)

Marger {p. 243) states that unlike the local power structure,
the national power structure is "too remote and perhaps too
mysterious to analyze with clear-cut procedures and testable
hypotheses.

11

Expressing similar sentiments to Marger's, Floyd Hunter (1953,
p. 2) whose landmark study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia)
was discussed in Chapter I, contends that

11
•••

the community

is a primary place in which power relations can be most easily
observed."
This study of the Stanton Energy Center, which is an empirical
examination of power relations in the Qrlando community, has drawn
largely on the tradition established by researchers such as Hunter
and the Lynds mentioned in Chapter I.

Although the Lynds' study

of Muncie, Indiana (Middletown) has been considered a "comprehensive
sociological portrait" by some scholars of power, it nevertheless
dealt considerably with the specific issue of local power (Marger,
1981, p. 243).
11

Who made the decisions in the community?" and "Who controlled

the major institutions and resources?" are key questions in these
forementioned works and in the present study of the OUC power-plant
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study.

The author's interviews with local decison. makers as well as

observation of local decision. makers, and the investigation of
interest group operations bring to light discernible patterns of
power in the Orlando community.
Since much of the political interest generated throughout the
fight over the plant resulted from the direct and active involvement
of the various community groups, it seems appropriate that a detailed
analysis of the 9pposition posed by these organizations and the
subsequent impact in the issue in question be attempted.

A brief

general discussion of the nature and function of groups in the
political system seems an ideal preface to the primary concern of
group impact on the OUC power plant.
The function of groups in American politics has long been a
major preoccupation among political scientists.

Marger (1981, p. 43)

notes that ·the interest group version of pluralism "sees associations
acting as pressure groups upon government . . . supporting isssues
and political actions of importance to their members.

They serve

as a means by which individuals with common interests may exert
influence on decision. makers by collective action."
Marger's view mirrors that of David Truman (1951), a midtwentieth century group theorist who saw organizational membership
as the primary means by which individuals could "influence and
ultimately control" decision makers. Truman, who has been credited
with engineering the concept of "potential groups," portrayed
the U.S. political system as basically revolving around the
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interplay of many varied interest or pressure groups--the
assumption that all interests affected by an issue will be
represented .
Similarly, Dahl (1967, p. 145), also a major exponent of pluralism,
defines "the normal American political process as one in which .
an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself
heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of
decision. 11
As mentioned in Chapter I, the core of Dahl's theory is the
division of political power into many different seats.
words,

11

In Dahl's

The fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of

American pluralism is, I" believe, this:

Instead of a single

center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of
power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign 11 (Dahl, 1967, p. 24).
From Dahl's standpoint, bargaining negotiation, and compromise are
still the basic characteristics of the U.S. pluralist system.
However, as Marger (1981) points out, it is now "bargaining,
negotiating and compromise among elites which preserve democracy."
The most poignant vindication of group pluralism in
America comes from Rose (1967, p. 247) who states that:
Through the voluntary association, the ordinary
citizen can acquire as much power in the .community
or the nation as his free time, ability and inclinations
permit him to, without actually going into government
service, provided he accepts the competition for power
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of other like-minded citizens • . . Political power or
influence in the United States is not concentrated
in the government, but it is distributed over as
many citizens, working through their associations
as want to take the responsibility for power.
But neither Rose nor his pluralist disciples have been able
to convince other scholars of power that groups are indeed the
definers, operators, and movers within the U.S. political
f'

process.

In a scathing critic1sm of the pluralist conception of

group function Gamson (1972, p. 61) states that:
The pluralist interpretation of the American political
system seems to make sense of a great body of historical
and contemporary experience.

Yet, there is reason to

doubt that it captures the full truth; rather, it is a
partial truth that misses or blurs certain problems
and paints an overly sanguine picture of the operation
of power in American society.
Gamson ·(1972, p. 61) argues that pluralists, Like ·Dahl, who view
the American system as multiple centers of power which help "to
tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts
peacefully," tend to regard urban violence and the considerable
history of violent conflict in this country as "abnormalities or
pathologies, arising from the gap between an always imperfect
reality and an ideal abstract model. 11
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Other political scientists, including Parenti and
Schattschneider, have also rejected the interest-group version of
pluralism because of its inherent class bias.

Participation of

almost any kind in the political process is limited to higher
class and status groups, critics of pluralism contend.
Expanding on this observation, Parenti (1970, pp. 52-53) argues
that "The belief that lower-strata groups exercise a constant, albeit
indirect, power remains an article of faith rather than a
demonstrated proposition.

11

Parenti 's assertion stemmed from his

study of the way local government officials responded to three
issues actively fought by residents of a ghetto area of Newark in
the mid-1960s.

The author concluded that since active lower-class

groups were unsuccessful in influencing decision makers, there was
even less reason to think they might wield influence when inactive.
In his allusion to the impotence of lower-class groups in
the U.S. political system, Schattschneider (1975, pp. 34-35)
argues that:
The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.
Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot
get into the pressure system.
Interest group pluralism has been criticized not only for its
pro-business and class bias, but also for its divisive potentials
and the crippling effects it has on the institution of government.
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According to Theodore J. Lowi
without merit,

11

(1979~

p. 36), pluralism is not

but the zeal of pluralism for the group and its

belief in a natural harmony of group competition tended to break
down the very ethic of government by reducing the essenti a 1
conceptions of government to nothing more than another set of
mere interest groups."
Expressing a similar view, Harvard University President
Derek Bok clai

that:

;-

America no longer seems diverse so much as it seems
split asunder into innumerable special interests.

When

so many groups organize to protect their special
interests, the politics of activism can become the
politics of immobility, and we find ourselves unable
to reach effective solutions for inflation, energy
shortages, environmental issues, or other national
problems (Bok's work (cited in Wooten, 1985)).
If Bok and his colleagues are right, then one can speculate
that the activities of the groups which opposed the OUC power
plant might have been counterproductive, simply because too many
dissenting voices were involved.

However, before making such a

generalization, one should carefully consider the counterarguments on group activism in the political system.

Furthermore,

no analysis of group function and performance is complete without
an examination of the resources available to each group and the
political climate in which it operates.
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P.O.W.E.R. Now, the Sierra Club, Citizens for Conservation
and all the other groups which fought to stop construction of the
Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center describe themselves as grass
roots organizations.

This categorization militated against these

advocacy groups battling a giant utility such as OUC.
William T. Gormley's (1983) summary of differences between grass
roots advocacy organizations and what he calls proxy advocacy organ...

izations underscores some of the odds with which opponents of the
Stanton plant contended.

Proxy advocates is defined as government

organizations that represent residents of a particular jurisdiction
in another government organization's proceedings.

Grass-roots

organizations, on the other hand, are private organizations that
promote interests unrelated to their members' occupations.
Among other things, Gormley (1983, p. 87) states that:

(1) proxy

advocates are much better funded than grass roots advocates--in
general, grass roots advocates lack the resources to participate effectively in certain issue areas; (2) proxy advocates possess greater
expertise than grass root advocates.

Additionally, Gormley

notes that grass roots advocates seldom support higher utility
rates, but they strongly endorse conservation.
As Gormley points out, "effective participation" in certain
areas of community politics is largely dependent upon the amount
of resources a group has at its disposal.

Resources, which are

a major yardstick for measuring power, take many forms, including
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wealth, property, prestige, knowledge and expertise, and access
to or control of communicat i on outlets.
With this definition of resources, one can almost safely say
that one of--if not the foremost--obstacles faced by OUC's
opponents was lack of financial resources.

During their three-

year fight with OUC, critics of the Stanton plant managed to amass
less than $10,000, most of which came from members and supporters
of the various opposition groups.
The inferior financial status of these organizatons was
further dramatized when measured against the resources OUC had at
its disposal.

For the media campaign alone, the utility forked

out $175,000, adding to the $100,000 raised by Energy for Tomorrow
for the same purpose.
It is no wonder, then, .that this striking economic disparity
between OUC and its foes not only caught the attention of several
observers, but also seemed to have generated some sympathy.
Discussing the OUC-related call-in program aired by his
station prior to the referendum, WCPX-Channel 6 program producer
Mike Cerni states that:
One of the problems I've run into producing this thing
(program) is that OUC and Energy for Tomorrow have so
much more money than the other folks and a better
strategy for informing the public.

The other groups

just don't have that much money, and the information
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from them has been somewhat limited (Cerni, The Orlando
Sentinel, August 30, 1984, p. E-1).
In a similar vein, Pugh says ''Telling the story is not
enough without money.

It is very hard to tell a story in today's

economic climate unless you have a direct economic stake in the
project" (Hurvitz, Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984,
p. 8).
Both Cerni rand Pugh allude to a related, more far-reaching
dimension of the disadvantageous position in which plant critics
found themselves.

They had limited access to the media.

The

consequence of this inaccessibility has been aptly described by
Mills (1956, p. 314), who claims that "The freedom to raise issues
effectively seems more and more to be confined to those few interests
that have ready and continual access to these Media."
Hinting at this formidable roadblock confronted by critics of
the power

plant~

The Orlando Sentinel also contends that one

"serious flaw of the plant review process was that qualified
opponents lacked an expanded forum for their arguments" (Haile,
The Orlando Sentinel, February 11, 1983, p. A-18).
Considering the impact of the media on public opinion, one
should be able to easily appreciate why OUC and Energy for
Tomorrow, which outspent their opponents $20 to $1 on mail-outs,
newpaper, radio and television advertisements convinced a majority
of Orlando's voters to support the power plant.

Describing the

intensity of the OUC campaign, Pugh claims there were as many as

115
10 television advertisements per day in the last few weeks of the
referendum (Pugh, Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984, p. 8).
Data gathered for this paper suggest that had plant critics
been able to match the advertising outlay of the OUC and its
ally, the public debate and the legal struggle might have been
altered considerably, and as a result, the outcome of the
referendum might have been different.
,

One indication that seems to support this speculation was a
telephone poll conducted by The Sentinel in November 1983.

Of

3,518 Orlando residents who were asked if OUC should build the
new coal-fired power plant, 2,636--75 percent--voted

11

no 11 while

882 voted 11 yes 11 (The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. B-1).
According to The Sentinel, skepticism of government and concern
for the environment appeared to have been the primary reasons three
out of four respondents opposed the plant.
But there was a drastic change of opinion only a year later.
Support for the power facility had increased to 37 percent of the
voters polled in August 1984, but now only 27 percent opposed it.
The remaining 36 percent was undecided.

The day of the

referendum, voter support for the Stanton Energy Center had
jumped to a whopping 65 percent, compared to 35 percent
opposing (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 3, pp. A-1, A-12).
It is not possible to say what degree of the shift in
public opinion resulted directly from the massive media campaign
undertaken by OUC and Energy for Tomorrow prior to the referendum,
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since variables other than advertising might have influence The
Sentinel poll results.

However, it seems fair to assume that

advertising was one of the variables contributing to OUC's
success at the polls.
In fact, one observer, David Hurvitz, attributes the
success directly to the

11

intensive, last-minute advertising and

public relations effort by the OUC and its supporters" (Hurvitz,
Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984, p. 1).
An advertising campaign of the kind undertaken by OUC,
according to Mills (1956, p. 315) provides the public with an
education not for knowledge and citizen responsibility, but rather
for economic training to better serve the elites.
further explains, "are .

The media, Mills

among the most important of those

increased means of power now at the dispoaal of elites of wealth
and power."
But throughout its media campaign, OUC justified its action
as a necessary measure for ensuring that customers were properly
informed of the benefits they would derive from the new power
plant, and the consequences the community would suffer without
the facility.

Although this was indeed a credible explanation from

the perspective of the OUC, evidence cited by plant critics
supports the latter's allegations that there was also a "hidden
agenda" in OUC's fight for the power plant.

Much of the data

presented in this work seems to support the opposition's claim
that many of the orga~izations and people who proposed and
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joined forces to defeat the opposition, had a vested economic
interest in the project.
Westinghouse, which built the generator for the plant; Black
and Veatch, who did the final design work; and Mudge Rose, a firm
involved in the issuance of OUC bonds; all contributed to the
utility's media campaign.

More than 95 percent of the $100,000

raised by Energy for Tomorrow for OUC came from out of state firms,
who overwhelmingly were going t9 directly gain financially from
construction of the plant.
The bias of the legal struggle was not confined to critics'
inability to successfully compete with OUC's financial strength.
Unlike its opponents, who were largely dependent on volunteer
legal aid, OUC had at its disposal several full-time attorneys to
carefully prepare its cases in defense of the power plant.
Consequently, the utility's chances of presenting more convincing
cases were much greater than those of their critics, who could not
afford full-time counsel.
Apart from overpowering its adversaries in the public forum,
OUC further rendered its foes almost impotent by invoking a
mobilization of bias against some crucial issues.

Perhaps the

most blatant display of this occurrence was the referendum
itself.

All through the struggle with OUC, critics emphasized

that their opposition to the power plant stemmed from their
convictions that the new facility would pollute the environment,
result in higher electricity bills, and that it was unneeded.
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However, none of these concerns was raised by OUC in the
referendum.
As early as 1982, a spokesman for the Sierra Club stated
that:
The Sierra Club is not

blindly obstructing progress

in its opposition to this OUC coal-burning plant.

If

the new power plant were truly needed to supply electric
,

power for necessary customer service or economic growth,
our position would be different.

However, the known

adverse environmental and social impacts coupled with
the substantial economic risks are totally unacceptable
when the plant is not needed (Entwistle, The Orlando
Sentinel, April 24, 1982, p. A-18).
Despite these explicit statements outlining these critics'
position, and despite the fact that most of the debate generated by
the new plant centered on the broader questions of whether the
plant was necessary, and if the city of Orlando shou.ld participate
in the construction of the plant, the referendum on September 4,
1984 addressed only the latter, and least important issue.
Opponents, supporters and utility officials all had agreed that
the real issue facing the voters was the 'need' question.
As Ferran puts it, "When voters go to the polls, most will be
basing their vote on whether they want the plant or don't want
the plant.

That's the heart of it" (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel,

August 19, 1984, p. A-1).
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But hardly could this have been the case on the day of election,
since the chief issues around which the opposition had been built
were systematically "organized out of the decision-making
11

process.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the mobilization of

bias is a common feature of the political game--some issues are
organized into politics, while others, like the 'need' issue in
the OUC case, are organized out.

It was the OUC that decided what

i'

the game was about and subsequently decided what, in this instance,
got in the game.
While the utility sidestepped the question of need--keeping the
issue in the realm of non-decision-making--it highlighted in its
advertisements, for example, the fact that $120 million had already
been spent on the plant.

Obviously this was an important issue for

OUC offi ci a1s, and was therefore treated accordingly.
project of this magnitude, you reach a

pain~

"With any

where you must decide

whether to defer or go ahead," OUC general manager Henry Luff
explains.

"We reached that point in April 1983, when the OUC

board decided to go ahead with the project" (Simmons, The Orlando
Sentinel, August 19, 1984, p. A-18).
It is no wonder, then, that while OUC was battling its
critics, it maintained that regardless of the outcome of the
referendum the plant construction would be continued.
Why, then, did OUC expend all this effort and money on a
referendum that would in no way alter their plans for the power

120

plant?

An observation by Mills sheds some light on this baffling

occurrence.

Mills (1956, p. 317) contends that:

Authority 'formally' resides in the people, but
the power of initiation is in fact held by small
circles of men.

That is why the standard strategy

of manipulation is to make it appear that the
people, or at least a large group of them, 'really
~

made the decision.'
Again, there is no conclusive evidence that the referendum
was a manipulative weapon used by OUC and its supporters against
its customers.

However, Mills' theory should not be dismissed as

a possible explanation for the referendum, considering especially
the time lapse--five months--between the court ruling and the
actual voting.

Additionally, although the precise impact of the

OUC-invoked mobilization of bias cannot now be determined, given
the circumstantial evidence available, the author is inclined to
believe the outcome of the referendum would have been different had
the issues around which the controversy revolved appeared before
the voters.
In addition to invoking a mobilization of bias against key
issues, OUC in its fight for the plant, apparently exploited other
available resources beyond the reach of the opposition.

If

Thomas R. Dye (1972, p. 24) is correct, then it was the "wealth,
organizational strength, leadership, access to decision makers,
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and internal cohesion" of the OUC system that were responsible for
the utility's victory over its critics.
The pivotal role of these characteristics in defeating
opposition in any controversial issue cannot be overemphasized.
Obviously aware of this fact, OUC endeavored for the three-year
period it battled plant opponents to present the public a united
front at all times--at no time was there any indication of internal
dissension or

~isloyalty.

This is the kind of unity, solidarity

or coherence of which Mills, Meisel and other scholars talk.
According to elitist theorists, this kind of group
consciousness and "common will of action" are exclusive preserves
of society's elites--preserves which clearly make them "different
from and more cohesive than those they govern" (Presthus, 1974, p. 334).
These theorists, nevertheless, emphasize that cohesion without
access to the point of decision can lose its efficacy in the
political process.
"Toward whatever institution of government we observe
interest groups operating, the common feature of all their
efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of
decision," Truman states.

Access, Truman further argues, is their

"intermediate facilitative objective" (Truman, 1951, pp. 264-265).
In addition, Truman contends that a group's chance of
attaining the desired access are determined by three variables:
(1) the position of the organization in the social structure;
(2) the skills and other qualities of leadership; and
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(3) effective organization in terms of the issue at stake.
The third variable, means "knowing the ropes" and being
sufficiently cohesive as an organization to enable its weight
to be brought to bear 11 (Truman, 1951, pp. 198-200).
But perhaps the most striking OUC-related case alluding to
the crucial role of access in the political arena was that
reported in The Orlando Sentinel in October 9, 1982.

Frederick

I'

Bryant, attorney for the Florida Municipal Power Association (FMPA),
was chided by The Sentinel (1982) for

11

pouring politics on fire. 11

In letters sent to 22 mayors across the state, Bryant states
that

11

1 am requesting your help in contacting the governor and

the Cabinet to express to them, 'as mayor of your city,• your
desire that the plant be approved by the Cabinet." According
to the Sentinel, Bryant included a form letter for the mayors
to fil 1 out and ma i 1 in, and urged them to "make full use of
whatever personal contacts" they could to lobby for the plant
(The Orlando Sentinel, October 9, 1982, p. A-14).
FMPA, a corporation of 33 small-city utilities that
jointly finance larger power projects, had originally agreed to
buy 38 percent of the Stanton Energy Center, but later changed
its mind when individual cities, including Lakeland, decided they
would not need the additional power.
The question of how successful Bryant's networking was in
this particular instance is immaterial.

What matters here is an

understanding that an individual such as Bryant could and would
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use his privileged position to get through to decision makers, ·
while other less powerful groups do not have access to this
kind of resource.
Presthus (1974) argues:
The functional need for some process of integrating
discrete social interests, of determining major social
purposes and allocating the resources needed to achieve
them--all require an ultimate coordinating instrument.
The process by which these -ends are achieved may usually
be conceptualized as one of the elite accommodation.
Integrating the so-called private and public sectors
is the essence of this process.

(p. 332)

Based on his analysis of the Bryant case, the author of this
study believes that accessibility to decisionmakers was one of the
greatest advantages OUC had over its critics.

Not only did the

OUC have access to decision makers, but it also had the outright
endorsement of some.

After all, the OUC is a self-nominating

commission that is confirmed by the Orlando City Counci _l.

Orlando

Mayor Bill Frederick, who is also an OUC board member, was one of
the most vocal supporters of the power plant, and also the chief
city official who decided against the original referendum proposal
on the issue.
As mentioned earlier, in the past 32 years the city council
has rejected none of OUC's nominees for board membership.

While

this occurrence does not necessarily indicate any abnormality in
administrative proceedings, it does infer the existence of the
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kind of relationship Mills and other single-elite theorists
claim to have found in elite-dominated societies.

These theorists

claim to have perceived among elites similar sociological
characteristics, including interests, social backgrounds, outlook,
and working relationship.

The two last elements seem to best

illustrate the unanimity displayed over the past 32 years by OUC
and the Orlando City Council.
Marger arg-ues:
In addition to their common social characteristics,
and perhaps of greater importance as a builder of
cohesion among them, is their close working
relationship.

Because their institutions overlap

functionally, elites of business, government, and
military find themselves continually interacting
with each other.

(p. 212)
Conclusion and Resolution

Generally, this study has concerned itself with -the ingredients
that define and sustain power in a community.

As the data

presented in this paper indicate, the concepts and operational
definitions of power are as numerous and varied as the theorists
themselves who postulate the findings on this rather polemic area
of social science.
In his quest to locate the locus of power in the Orlando
community, the author of the OUC study centered his investigation
around those who participated in the decision-making process from

125

which the power plant evolved.

While the investigation of this

matter has produced no definitive answers, numerous trends fitting
the theoretical molds--particularly that of the single-elite
theorist--were discernible.
The most striking feature of events in the OUC controversy is
the absence of mass participation of community-group involvement,
especially during the formative stages of decision-making.

It is

worth noting that -0f the 16 agencies deciding the power plant's
fate, not one was comprised of representatives of the vast
majority of OUC customers.
It is true, as Gormley (1983, pp. 94-98) points out, that
issues such as the OUC's involve "technical complexity--the
intellectual basis for decision-making."

In addition, Gormley

argues, a complexity is high when a policy problem requires
understanding of a specialist or expert, "a professional appraisal
more than a normative judgement. 11
In such cases, therefore, it is imperative that decision
makers assigned the responsibility of deciding crucial · matters
demonstrate appropriate expertise in their fields.

OUC's

claim that the individuals and agencies ruling on the power plant
possessed the required expertise in their respective areas
might be true.
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However, it appeared equally true that those opposing the
plant were no less knowledgeable on the subject of controversy.
To have refused from considering the opposition's arguments, OUC
might have cheated itself out of invaluable information-information that could have possibly saved the utility money,
keep electric bills low, and enhanced the company's credibility.
At no time during the debate on the plant's fate had OUC made
any concessions rto its critics, except when forced by the court
on the occasion of the referendum.

Apart from this one instance,

plans for the power facility proceeded, unaffected by continued
protest from those purporting to represent the general public.
That OUC took no initiative to include the majority of its
customers in the decision-making process, or to at least consider
the claims of plant critics, was no violation of democratic norms,
when viewed against single-elite theory.

One of the fundamental

tenets of the single-elite creed states essentially that:
Regardless of what kind of social system is evident
or what form of political or economic ideology is
proclaimed~

a relatively small number of people

always rules despite opposition (Presthus, 1974, p. 331).
If this theory can garner adequate empirical evidence, then the
contention by plural-elite theorists that public policy at any
given time is the equilibrium reached in the group struggle must
be rejected.

Without any reservations, the author of this
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study argues that the decision by OUC to continue building its
power plant, with the backing of the city of Orlando, in no way
reflected the "equilibrium" plural-elitists reportedly have found
operating in the political arena.
At no time during the three-year struggle between OUC and
critics had there been any indication of group equilibrium.

In

fact, there was absolutely no mutual dialogue between the feuding
parties.

Their only face-to-face meeting was in court.

Though group participation might have had positive side
effects on OUC's subsequent actions, it certainly did not influence
the utility's decision on the power plant.
Graham Wootton's (1985, p. 309) observation of group influence
on public policy seems to be an accurate appraisal of the extent to
to which OUC critics impact the utility's plant decision.

"The

bewildering struggle of advocacy groups," Wootton writes, "might
achieve catharsis rather than the substance of policy."
Like Wootton's view, similar arguments presented by other
social scientists underscore the minimal impact of opposition
groups on decision makers.

Lester Malbraith (1963, p. 354), for

example, claims that group activities rarely alter the course of
government actions.

"Observations of governmental decision-making

have concluded that the overall impact of group lobbying is
relatively minor," Malbraith notes.
It is this author's opinion that despite the odds against
the power plant critics, they might have fared better in the
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struggle had they been more attuned to the rules of the political
game that was being played by OUC and its supporters.
Throughout the campaign, OUC adamantly demonstrated that
there was little direct public control of its actions--at least
in this case.

The utility and its allies could not have made

it any clearer that it was economic considerations and not the
quest to appear democratic which ultimately influenced their
decision on the coal-fired plant.
but somehow it eluded critics.
defense primarily around

11

This was the crux of the matter,

So while the utility built its

technocracy 11 --emphasizing the primacy

of technical expertise in deciding the fate of the coal plant-opponents harped on the need for democracy in the decision-making
process-mass participation, an elected OUC board and revision of
the city charter.
Had plant critics capitalized more on the fact that OUC
supporters showed no respect for general-public sentiments,
more voters probably would have dissapproved of the .power plant.
Considering, on the other hand, the impact of . other variables,
such as alienation and apathy on voter behavior, it is possible,
too, that the outcome of the struggle would have been the same.
Besides, as mentioned earlier, plant critics lacked funds and
therefore could not have fully exploited

th~

numerous tactics

they could have employed to fight OUC and its allies.
Additionally, the author notes that the vast majority--if
not all--the members of the opposition groups, especially the
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the leaders, were from the lower-upper and middle classes of
society,--attorneys, business people and city officials, among
them.

How this affected their perception of the masses they

purportedly represented is not known.

Neither has it been

determined from this study how the general public perceived
their self-nominated advocates.
Also noteworthy is the relatively low profile given critics
to the fact that a disproportionate number of the individuals and
groups supporting the power plant were from out of state.

What

this investigation suggests about local leadership and
representation is a question yet to be addressed by opponents.
Highlighting some of the positive effects of the struggle
over the coal-fired plant, an Orlando Sentinel editor states that
"the most positive thing to come out of this fierce debate has been
a stronger commitment by OUC to promote energy conservation''
(Healy, The Orlando Sentinel, September 6, 1984, p. A-18).
Additionally, the paper claims that "If nothing else it (the
debate) has taught OUC that it cannot run over its customers and
shut them out of the decision-making process" (The Orlando Sentinel,
August 22, 1984, p. A-14)
The activities of the various advocacy groups, and OUC's
response to their challenges also lend

suppo~t

to the single-

elite postulate that the citizenry as a whole is powerless.
Whether intentionally or not, OUC officials, on numerous
occasions, alluded to this condition of powerlessness of the
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masses.

Steve Willis, a utility spokesman, perhaps provided the

best demonstration of the subordinate position to which OUC's
92,000 customers had been relegated.
According to Willis, the utility was under no obligtion to
justify the construction _of the plant to its customers.

' The
1

people we have to prove the plant to are the state Cabinet,"
Willis states.

"We really don't see a need for countering their
r

(critics) claim

1
'

(Abrahams, .The Orlando Sentinel, May 2,

p. B-1).

Not only has Willis' statement underscored the political
impotence of OUC's customers in deciding the plant's future,
but it also suggests a compelling mutuality and cohesion among
the dominant group who are the decision makers.
From the single-elitist standpoint, OUC's systematic
exclusion of the masses from fully participating in the powerplant deliberations, not only rendered the latter powerless, but
also stripped them of self-respect.

For according

~o

Mills (1959,

pp. 3-44), one's participation in decision-making is the essence
of power and self-respect.
To counter Mill's argument, one might argue that the OUC
board of directors and the related decision-making bodies needed
not consult with or solicit input from customers, since these
decision makers were elected by the people to represent them.

But

considering that most of the individuals and agencies ruling on the
power--from the OUC board members down to the environmental
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agencies--had not been elected by the public, one is therefore
inclined to question the legitimacy of OUC's action and the meaning
of democracy, as it relates to public-service establishments such
as OUC.
In fact, this was one of the primary bases of the opposition
launched ·by critics against the power plant.
opponents posed was:
business and

soci~l

The question

Should a small group of what they call
elites, selected by their peers, be entrusted

to make decisions having major consequences on thousands of
residents?
Ironically though, while a small and vocal minority agitated
for changes in the OUC's organizational structure, the vast
majority of people, in whose behalf the advocates purportedly
worked, remained quiescent.

The signing of the petition, calling

for the referendum on the plant, was the only demonstration of
mass participation in the issue under study.
If plural-elite theorists are correct, then, this phenomenon
must be interpreted as a function of "organizational constraints
and mass apathy," assumed to "deter the activism of large numbers
of people."

Marger (1981, p. 50) argues that mass participation, from

the plural-elitist standpoint, is seen not as a desirable goal for
which to strive, but as a potential threat to the continued
. stability of the sociopolitical system."

If the uninformed

masses participate in large numbers, democratic self-restraint
will break down and peaceful competition among elites--the central
element in the elite-pluralist theory--will become impossible."
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OUC's resistance to attempts by critics to incite widespread
public participation in the power plant decision bears close
resemblance to the plural-elitists' fear here described by
Marger.

The utility's apparent indifference to mass participation

remains a nagging concern of this author.
Why did company officials constantly emphasize that the
referendum would have nothing to do with whether or not
construction of

t~e

plant would be continued?

Why did OUC proceed

with building the facility, awa·rding as much as $155 million in
contracts even before the plant had been approved?

To have

insisted that a public vote on the issue would not have altered
the utility's plans for the power facility again, generates
questions on the meaning of democracy. Most importantly, this
position points to the locus of power in the Orlando community,
at least on an issue such as this:

power resides in the hands of

the few, and the many are rigidly restricted in their attempts to
modify this power.
On the question of why the OUC proceeded to award as many
contracts as it did before the plant was approved, one can almost
without reservation, interpret this as a major strategy used by
utility officials to apply pressure to decision makers to rule in
OUC's favor.

In fact, this was one of the arguments both the

utility and its supporters highlighted in their media campaign-with so much money already invested, "it is too late to stop
now" (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13,

1983, p. A-6).
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The data presented in this study, however, alone, does not
provide a solid enough basis for making conclusive pronouncements
on the Orlando power structure.

Nevertheless, based on the

operational definitions of power discussed in Chapter I, the
author of this paper believes his findings do fit some of the
theoretical patterns espoused by the single-elitist school of
thought.

There is, for example, no question that the idea for

the Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center originated not with OUC's
customers, but rather with the utility's consultants--men
occupying what Polsby calls the "apex of the power pyramid"
(Polsby, 1980, p. 10).

Also, like the elites described by single-

elite theorists, OUC decision makers were able to prevail in the
fight for the power plant, not necessarily because of their
superior knowledge or intelligence, but rather by virtue of their
positions in the sociopolitical system.

Their high degree of

coherence and group consciousness were part and parcel of the
process by which their opponents were defeated.
The overwhelming and prompt response of business people
nationwide to Energy for Tomorrow's call for help to fight
Stanton's critics is perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of
group solidarity.

Equally noteworthy was the zeal with which some

of the corporations which had secured contracts on the new OUC
plant came out in defense of these economic interests.
Westinghouse, for example, fearing that any opposition to the
plant might have jeopardized its $27 million contract, went as far
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as joining OUC in its legal battles with critics.

Though this

may be but one example, the Westinghouse case does fit the mold
of the self-serving, intertwined elite scenario portrayed by
Mills, Meisel and other single-elite theorists.

The distinction

between their private need and the public good disappears in the
assertion that they are one and the same thing.
Similarly, a small group of individuals, functi6ning in a
system resembling what Miils (.1956, p. 343) calls the

11

vertically-

structured elite-dominated political and social system," was
the dominant group participating and subsequently prevailing in
The question of who will

the power-plant decision-making process.

ultimately benefit most from the construction of the power plant,
the author believes cannot be given a definitive answer at this
point in time.

However, the evidence in this study indicates that

the immediate benefits from the Stanton Energy Center will be
reaped not by OUC customers, but rather

by

financiers, labor

unions, large corporations, and contractors.

APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OUTLINE OF CRITICAL DECISIONS AND
DATES OF OUC CONTROVERSY
April 1978:

OUC decided to build the new coal-fired plant
"to meet future energy demands," based on Black
and Veatch' s ·recommendation.

January 1980:

A 3,280-acre site in southeast Orange County was
chosen for the plant.

May 1981:

Westinghouse Electric ·corporation was hired to
build a turbine generator for the 415-megawatt
power facility.

August 1981:

OUC presented environmental-impact statement to
the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.

October 1981:

The Public Service Commission certified need
for the plant.

June 1982:

Orange County Judge George Diamantis validated
$700 million in bonds that OUC planned to sell
to finance plant construction.

October 1982:

Orlando resident William Hall filed a suit in
Orange County Circuit Court, challenging OUC's
right to issue the bonds.

Hall asked that

validation proceedings be reopened.
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November 1982:

State hearing officer reviewed environmental
reports, and recommended that Governor Graham
and the Cabinet approve the plant.

December 1982:

(1) Graham and the Cabinet gave final approval

for the power plant; (2) Orange County Circuit
Judge Richard Cooper denied Hall's motion to reopen
bond-validation proceedings; (3) The Committee to
Stop the Coal Plant--forerunner of P.O.W.E.R. Now-organized and started a petition to let Orlando
residents vote on the plant.
January 1983:

Hall appealed his case to the Florida Supreme
Court.

The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit in the

5th District Court of Appeal in Daytona Beach
against OUC to reopen need-certification hearings
for the plant.
April 1983:

Florida Supreme Court upheld validation of OUC
bonds, on the ground that Hall's challenge was
filed late.

May 1983:

Orlando City Council refused to hold a vote on
the plant after P.O.W.E.R. Now presented a
petition signed by over 12,000 residents, calling
for a referendum on the plant.

August 1983:

P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Central Florida Young
Republicans sued Orlando to force a referendum
on the power plant; (2) The 5th District Court
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of Appeal ruled against the Sierra Club; (3) the
group's request for a new hearing on the plant
was denied.
September 1983:

The Sierra Club asked the appeal court for a
rehearing.

October 1983:

An Orange County Judge dismissed the suit by
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Young Republicans;
(2) The 5th District Court of Appeal denied the
Sierra Club a rehearing in the plant certification;
(3) P.O.W.E.R. Now took its case for a vote on the
OUC plant to the 5th District Court of Appeal;
(4) Site preparation for the plant began.

May 1894:

The 5th District Court of Appeal ruled for the
referendum on the plant.

September 1984:

Referendum held.
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